By Qamar Bashir

China has emerged as the prime driver and a leader of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) not only in the political, economic, and commercial sectors but also by providing the backbone of infrastructure, including roads, railroads, and air links. China has invested a total of $150 billion, reinforcing its broader Eurasian strategic sectoral development. This figure includes direct investments, loans, and financial support provided through various Chinese financial institutions such as the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund.

Seeing is believing. During my visit to China in August 2024, I witnessed the breathtaking development taking place at a neck-breaking speed, particularly in Xinjiang and Shaanxiprovinces, aimed at uplifting the SCO. While the SCO may not yet be equal to, it is becoming competitive with other regional organizations such as NATO, ASEAN, the EU, and BRICS. With two superpowers, China and Russia, as the engines of influence, weight, and financial might, the SCO, currently strong in Central Asia, is likely to expand its integration and scope to eventually become a global force. This will help balance Western influence, particularly in Eurasia, and serve as a platform for China and Russia to collaborate on regional issues.

During the visit, we observed that China has established sectoral hubs for all initiatives under the purview of the SCO, including security (counter-terrorism, regional stability) through the institutional framework of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). Economic cooperation is being advanced through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with China committing over $50 billion in infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and energy pipelines to enhance connectivity within the SCO region.

China has invested over $10 billion in the Digital Silk Road, focusing on digital infrastructure, including 5G networks, fiber optic cables, and smart city initiatives. It has invested $5-7 billion in developing logistics hubs, warehousing, and cross-border trade facilities. It has invested in agricultural R&D and joint ventures within SCO member states at around $2-3 billion, which includes funding for advanced farming techniques, seed development, and sustainable agriculture projects.

Besides providing sectoral hubs for SCO initiatives, which we witnessed firsthand, China is also pursuing highly capital-intensive bilateral projects with other SCO member countries.

In Tajikistan, China has invested approximately $3 billion in road and power infrastructure projects, while the Khorgos Gateway on the China-Kazakhstan border, a major logistics hub, has seen $2 billion in investments. Energy and industrial projects in Uzbekistan have attracted about $4 billion, and agricultural cooperation with Kazakhstan has involved around $1.5 billion. The China-Russia energy cooperation, particularly through the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, represents a $55 billion investment, while the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor has seen investments of $15 billion to enhance connectivity and trade.

The dividends of China’s aggressive integration with other SCO members have been immense. Since the formation of the SCO, bilateral trade and investment with its members have significantly expanded. Trade with Russia reached a record $190 billion in 2022, fueled by energy cooperation and infrastructure investments. In Central Asia, China’s trade with Kazakhstan surpassed $25 billion. Uzbekistan saw trade grow to around $8 billion, complemented by Chinese investments in agriculture and industrial sectors.

During our discussion, a key factor regarding Pakistan’s inability to fully utilize the SCO forum became clear. Pakistan, with its limited road connectivity, has failed to establish direct road, air, or rail links with other SCO members, especially Central Asian countries (CAC), Belarus, and Russia.

Unlike other SCO countries, which have multiple transportation links, Pakistan’s reliance on the KKH as its only road connection with China makes it vulnerable to disruptions and limits its scope for increasing trade or engaging in regional transportation networks.

Pakistan lacks direct railroad connections with other SCO member countries, including the CAC. In contrast, China, Russia, and the CAC are connected via major rail corridors that facilitate trade and transportation.

These countries are also connected through a network of highways, road links, and regional infrastructure projects. Pakistan, however, has not yet integrated into this network beyond its bilateral connection with China through the KKH. While Pakistan has air links with China, it lacks extensive air transportation routes with Central Asian SCO members. Air transport between Pakistan and other SCO states is relatively underdeveloped compared to the routes between China, Central Asia, and Russia.

Pakistan’s limited transport links with other SCO members restrict its ability to fully benefit from the economic and trade opportunities within the organization. CAC, Russia, and China can trade and cooperate more seamlessly because of their physical connectivity, while Pakistan’s relative isolation limits its engagement beyond its bilateral relationship with China.

This lack of connection to Central Asian markets and other SCO member states means Pakistan cannot easily participate in the expanding trade routes that China and Central Asia are developing. This isolation reduces Pakistan’s potential role as a transit country for SCO trade and restricts its access to CAC markets.

Pakistan’s limited integration into the SCO system compared to Central Asian states, Belarus, Russia, and others can be attributed to geopolitical tensions, infrastructural and economic limitations, security concerns, and internal political challenges. While Pakistan plays a vital role in China’s bilateral strategy, particularly through CPEC, its integration within the broader SCO framework remains limited due to these complex factors.

China is making concerted efforts across all dimensions to create enabling conditions for Pakistan through the bilateral platform of CPEC, providing a gateway to fully capitalize on the SCO’s opportunities. However, our inability to rise to the occasion stems from a national attitude marked by lethargy, lack of seriousness, and a failure to harness our inherent potential. It is crucial that we move beyond the petty issues that drain the energy of our already strained state structure. Now is the time to proactively enhance our regional connectivity, diversify our economic ties, deepen security cooperation, and take on a more active leadership role within the SCO. By leveraging our strategic position and engaging more deeply with other SCO members, Pakistan can maximize its benefits from the organization and play a stronger role in shaping regional affairs. The path forward requires decisive action, focused on long-term national interests, to unlock the full potential of our participation in the SCO.

By Qamar Bashir

Former Press Secretary to the President

Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France

Former MD, SRBC, CEO, ATV

By Qamar Bashir

In Pakistan, we often adhere to the belief that force is the primary solution for dealing with terrorists, extremists, separatists, insurgents, and even civil unrest, whether it involves political, religious parties, students, or civil society. The prevailing notion is that if force doesn’t achieve the desired outcome, more force should be applied. In contrast, China’s approach in Xinjiang, where separatism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism were significant issues since 1949, has been to respond with development. When challenges arise, China has chosen to accelerate development further. These two philosophies—force versus development—are starkly opposed and have yielded opposite results.

The insurgencies in Xinjiang, Balochistan, and Pakistan’s erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have distinct historical, ethnic, and geopolitical contexts, yet they share similarities in grievances but differ markedly in the governmental responses.

The narratives of the insurgencies in Xinjiang, Balochistan, and FATA share more similarities than differences.

In Xinjiang, the Uyghur insurgency is driven by claims of cultural and religious repression, economic disenfranchisement, and ethnic discrimination. The insurgents frame their struggle as a fight for cultural survival and autonomy, often invoking the idea of an independent “East Turkestan.”

The Baloch insurgency, while lacking a religious element, is fueled by economic exploitation, particularly in natural resources like gas and minerals, political marginalization, and human rights abuses. As one of Pakistan’s least developed regions, many Baloch feel excluded from their own wealth, seeking greater autonomy or independence, citing historical grievances and ongoing exploitation.

In FATA, the insurgency stems from resistance to Pakistan’s military operations, perceived interference in local customs, and the impact of the war on terror. The TTP, in particular, framed its struggle in religious terms, opposing the Pakistani state’s alignment with the US and seeking to impose their version of Sharia law.

When comparing the narratives of these three ethnic groups, the Uyghur and Taliban in FATA share more similarities, particularly in their use of religious connotations to justify their struggles for autonomy or independence. In contrast, the Baloch narrative is distinctive due to its focus on economic and political grievances, without a religious dimension. Consequently, the Baloch narrative may be easier to address or counter compared to the more deeply rooted and ideologically driven narratives of the TTP and Uyghurs.

To counter the Baloch insurgency and integrate the Baloch people into the national mainstream, the government only had to adopt a holistic approach to address the root causes of the conflict, including economic marginalization, political exclusion, and cultural grievances by investing in local development, ensuring fair resource distribution, and enhancing political representation while granting greater administrative autonomy to Balochistan.

On the contrary, the government response to deal with insurgency in Balochistan is normally perceived exactly the opposite. The propaganda war has inculcated the impression albeit without any conclusive evidence that the response of   Pakistan’s government included military operations, targeted killings, enforced disappearances.The media is rife with reports that tens of thousands of people, including insurgents, civilians, and security personnel, have been killed in the ongoing conflict making this conflict as one of Pakistan’s deadliest.

Similarly the response of the Government to erstwhile FATA is perceived primarily kinetic. Reportedly, the Pakistani government has conducted numerous military operations (e.g., Operation Zarb-e-Azb) to dismantle militant networks. The insurgency and counter-insurgency operations have led to tens of thousands of deaths, including militants, security forces, and civilians. Displacement and destruction of infrastructure have also been significant.

Contrastingly, in Xinjiang, the Chinese government primarily pursued the policy of development which worked like magic. The region has purposefully made a lynchpin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020), China invested over $100 billion in Xinjiang’s development. The substantial investment has also been made in infrastructure, industry, IT, and modern agriculture, as part of its broader strategy to integrate the region more closely with the rest of the country and to address the underlying economic disparities that contribute to unrest.

Xinjiang now boasts a state of art modern  transportation network, including railways, highways, and airports connecting it to major cities in China and neighboring countries. Notable projects include the Urumqi-Hami section of the Lanzhou-Xinjiang high-speed railway, which links Xinjiang to the eastern provinces. The total investment in these transportation projects over the years runs into tens of billions of dollars.

Cities like Urumqi, Kashgar have been developed on ultramodern lines including the construction of modern residential areas, commercial centers, and public facilities and development of “new towns” to accommodate the growing population and improve living standards.

Xinjiang has become a hub for energy production, particularly in coal, oil, and natural gas. The region is also a significant producer of cotton and textiles, beside adorning industrial parks and zones for petrochemicals and mining, and Kashgar Economic Development Zone and the Urumqi Economic and Technological Development Zone. In addition,   IT parks,  advanced surveillance technologies, data centers, technology parks, 5G networks, cloud computing, and big data technologies have been developed to attract domestic and foreign investment.

In the agriculture sector China has introduced modern water management, crop genetics, and mechanization to substantially enhance the yield of cotton, grapes, and melons production, besides setting up of  large-scale farms, processing plants, and distribution networks.

These investments are part of China’s broader strategy to stabilize the region, boost economic growth, and integrate Xinjiang more closely with the rest of the country and the global economy, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative.

Contrarily the investments in FATA and Balochistan pale in comparison to the scale of investment made by China in Xinjiang. While China’s investments in Xinjiang have transformed the region’s infrastructure and economy, Pakistan’s investments in FATA and Balochistan are insignificant and are plagued by issues like governance challenges, security concerns, and underutilization of funds no matter how meager.

China’s investments in Xinjiang are part of a strategic focus on integrating the region into the national economy and the Belt and Road Initiative. In contrast, Pakistan’s investments in FATA and Balochistan have often been reactive, addressing immediate security concerns rather than being part of a long-term strategic vision for regional development.

If we genuinely aim to reintegrate FATA and Balochistan into the national mainstream, we must adopt the Chinese philosophy of development and more development. Without this focus on economic and social progress, the cycle of violence from both the government and insurgents will persist, leaving the regions mired in conflict and instability. Development offers the only sustainable path to peace and inclusion.

By Qamar Bashir

Former Press Secretary to the President

Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France

Former MD, SRBC, CEO, ATV

By Qamar Bashir

If I were to ask you to name the country that hosts one of the largest Islamic research institutes in the world, an Islamic institute housing over 50,000 books on Islam, your mind might naturally scan through Muslim-majority countries or even Western nations with significant Islamic scholarship. But what if I told you that this remarkable center isn’t in any of those places, but rather in our iron brother, China?

Yes, you read that right. In China, there’s an Islamic institute that boasts a digital library with hundreds of workstations for students, state-of-the-art hostels that accommodate over 500 students at a time, and a university that provides a generous stipend to its students along with guaranteed job placement. This university also has prayer halls equipped with hot and cold water year-round, and a mosque capable of hosting hundreds of Muslims for their five daily prayers in complete freedom and security. It’s a place where the pursuit of Islamic knowledge is nurtured with the utmost care and respect.

I recently spent three days in Urumqi, a city once known as a hotbed of unrest in China. This was my second visit to this north western city after a gap of ten years, and the transformation I witnessed was nothing short of remarkable. Unlike Pakistan, where most cities—save for a few exceptions—seem to have deteriorated over time, Urumqi has evolved into something entirely different.

Ten years ago, Urumqi had the feel of a small town with a rudimentary industrial base. The streets were sparsely populated with cars, and the Grand Bazaar had the appearance of something akin to our own Raja Bazaar. But today, Urumqi is a city reborn. It now boasts an IT park, Innovative Development Corridor of Urumqi Economic and Development Zone, Software Park, Taishan Cloud Computing Industry Base and Green Valley Scientific Innovation Town  where leading Chinese and international companies have established their regional headquarters, research and innovation centers, manufacturing plants, and import-export hubs providing jobs of hundreds and thousands of local youths.

I had the unique experience of wandering through the Grand Bazaar in Urumqi, which has undergone a remarkable transformation in recent years. What was once a traditional market is now a state-of-the-art bazaar, offering every food, fruit, and sweet delicacy imaginable. The atmosphere was vibrant, with dance performances, live music, and cultural displays adding a festive touch to the bustling market.

One of the most striking changes was the shift in security measures. Instead of a heavy presence in the bazaar itself, security has been moved to control rooms, allowing people to enjoy a sense of freedom and ease as they explore. Unlike my visit twelve years ago, when only a few faces reflected prosperity, now you would be hard-pressed to find anyone who appeared to be in poverty or distress.

The cultural experience at Xinjiang Art Theatre was nothing short of overwhelming. Tall, beautifully dressed girls with bright, glittering smiles, along with young boys and handsome men, danced to traditional Muslim folk tunes. Their graceful dance steps and the melodious music filled the entire atmosphere with a sense of magic and celebration, making the experience truly unforgettable.

I also had the opportunity to visit Yinning, another city in Xinjiang, which has developed into a bustling commercial and industrial complex along the Kazakhstan border, right on the Euro rail route. Here, towering high-rise buildings and shopping complexes have sprung up, where Chinese and Kazakh citizens engage in frantic shopping sprees. The complex also features numerous food courts and even a 5D cinema. We watched a movie that almost physically transported us across the Euro Triangle, making half the journey feel incredibly real.

With substantial investment, the government has transformed the Grand Bazaar of Yining into a vibrant cultural hub. Beautifully decorated horse-drawn buggies now ferry delighted tourists through the artistically adorned bazaar and its surrounding streets. The houses in the vicinity of the bazaar have been converted into elegant guest and rest houses, where tourists can immerse themselves in the traditional lifestyle, experience local cooking, and savor delicious, mouthwatering home-cooked delicacies, along with homegrown fruits and vegetables. The out-of-this-world hospitality provided here not only offers tourists a unique cultural experience but has also given local households a decent livelihood. This innovative approach has successfully blended tourism with cultural preservation, benefiting both the visitors and the community.

The once poor, rustic, and rugged shepherds have been provided with excellent homes at just 20% of the cost, payable through easy installments. They have also been equipped with modern skills in cattle and sheep breeding, as well as the production of high-quality dairy products. Additionally, they have been trained in modern agricultural techniques, enabling them to achieve a decent living and sustainable higher income. This initiative has significantly improved their quality of life and economic prospects.

This is China’s five prong approach to counter extremism and terrorism from its soil. First, China linked Xinjiang with the nation’s main trade routes, integrating the region more closely with the rest of the country and boosting economic opportunities and providing thousands of high-quality jobs to the indigenous population.

Second, China revolutionized agriculture in Xinjiang by replacing primitive farming methods with ultra-modern techniques. This not only increased productivity but also improved the quality of life for farmers, reducing economic disparity and fostering stability.

Third, the government made significant investments in religious education, promoting it on modern footings. Religious schools and mosques received increased funding and state protection, which not only preserved religious practices but also modernized them, creating an environment where faith and progress could coexist.

Fourth, China passed numerous laws and regulations coupled with speedy justice aimed at narrowing the space for terrorism and extremism.

Finally, China made a concerted effort to reduce economic and financial disparities between Muslims and non-Muslims. The government valued and promoted Muslim social and cultural values, embracing them as an integral part of China’s cultural and social fabric fostering a sense of unity and belonging among its Muslim population.

Through these coordinated efforts, China has successfully transformed Xinjiang from a region plagued by unrest into one characterized by stability, prosperity, and cultural pride. This model, rooted in economic development, education, legal reform, and cultural integration, offers valuable lessons in how to address the complex challenges of extremism and terrorism.

However, when we compare China’s strategic interventions with our own efforts in Pakistan’s restive regions of Balochistan and the erstwhile FATA, we are met with a stark and, frankly, embarrassing contrast.

In these regions, we have largely relied on kinetic power, failing to complement it with the multifaceted approach that China has employed to reintegrate its restive regions into the national fold. The miscreants, as well as the innocent citizens who have been ensnared by the pernicious ideologies of terrorism and extremism, are our own brothers and sisters. We must not view their elimination as the sole strategy for peace.

While our armed forces are doing an exceptional job, rendering invaluable sacrifices in the fight against this two-headed monster, it is imperative that the civilian government and civil society step up to their responsibilities. We must look to China’s successful practices and adapt them to our context. By doing so, we can bring our misled and misguided brothers and sisters back into the national stream as responsible, skilled, and productive members of society. This comprehensive approach is not just a necessity; it is a moral imperative for the future of our nation.

By Qamar Bashir

Former Press Secretary to the President

Former Press Minister to the Embassy of Pakistan to France

Former MD, SRBC, CEO, ATV