Fading hopes for a revival of the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program potentially puts one more nail in the coffin of a regional security architecture that would include rather than target the Islamic republic.

The potential demise of the nuclear agreement, coupled with America redefining its commitment to Middle Eastern security as it concentrates on rivalry with Russia and China, spotlights the need for a regional security forum that would facilitate confidence-building measures, including common approaches to transnational threats such as climate change, food security, maritime security, migration, and public health.

Mitigating in favour of a firmer grounding of the reduction of regional tension is the fact that it is driven not only by economic factors such as the economic transition in the Gulf and the economic crisis in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt but also by big-power geopolitics.

China and Russia have spelled out that they would entertain the possibility of greater engagement in regional security if Middle Eastern players take greater responsibility for managing regional conflicts, reducing tensions, and their own defense.

Rhetoric aside, that is not different from what the United States, the provider of the Middle East’s security umbrella, is looking for in its attempts to rejigger its commitment to security in the Gulf.

In addition to the emerging, albeit tentative, unspoken, macro-level big power consensus on a more inclusive, multilateral approach, efforts by the major regional powers – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Israel, and Iran, except for as it regards ties between the Jewish state and the Islamic republics — to reduce tensions and put relations on a more even keel, contribute to an environment potentially conducive to discussion of a more broad-based security architecture.

The need to focus on conflict prevention and improved communication between regional rivals alongside more robust defense cooperation is evident irrespective of whether the Iran nuclear accord is brought back from the dead, given that the covert war between Israel and Iran will continue no matter what happens.

Israeli officials this month warned that an Israel airstrike against Syria’s Aleppo airport was a warning to President Bashar al-Assad that his country’s air transport infrastructure would be at risk if he continues to allow “planes whose purpose is to encourage terrorism to land,” a reference to flights operated on behalf of the Iranian military and Revolutionary Guards.

Even so, the Biden administration remains focused on broadening responsibility for a regional security architecture that targets Iran rather than an inclusive structure that would give all parties a stake, seek to address root problems, and stymie an evolving arms race.

The administration has encouraged security cooperation between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, the two Arab states that two years ago established diplomatic relations with Israel, and Saudi Arabia, which has changed its long-standing hostile attitudes towards the Jewish state but refuses to formalise relations in the absence of a resolution of the Palestinian problem.

The year’s move of Israel from the US military’s European to its Central Command (CENTCOM) that covers the Middle East facilitates coordination between regional militaries. In a first, Israel this year participated in a US-led naval exercise alongside Saudi Arabia, Oman, Comoros, Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan, countries with which it has no diplomatic relations, as well as the UAE and Bahrain.

In March, top military officers from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt met in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh to discuss the contours of potential military cooperation.

Similarly, the US, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are attempting to create a regional air defense alliance. In June, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz claimed the partnership had already thwarted Iranian attacks.

Similarly, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are working on a fleet of naval drones to monitor Gulf waters and ward off Iranian threats.

Furthermore, CENTCOM plans to open a testing facility in Saudi Arabia to develop and assess integrated air and missile defense capabilities.

Scholar Dalia Dassa Kaye argues that focusing on confidence-building aspects of cooperative security involving a dialogue that aims to find common ground to prevent or mitigate conflict rather than collective security that seeks to counter a specific threat is one way of breaking the Middle East’s vicious circle.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) patchwork of security structures, alliances between external powers and individual association members, and inclusive regional forums demonstrate that the two security approaches are not mutually exclusive.

The ASEAN model also suggests that, at least initially, a less centralized and institutionalized approach may be the best way to kickstart moves towards regional cooperative security in the Middle East.

Negotiating an agreement on principles guiding regional conduct on the back of exchanges between scholars, experts, and analysts, as well as informal, unofficial encounters of officials, could be a first step.

To be sure, Iran’s refusal to recognize Israel and its perceived goal of destroying the Jewish state likely constitutes the foremost obstacle to initiating an inclusive, cooperative security process.

The carrot for Iran will have to be credible assurances that the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel will not pursue regime change in Tehran and recognize that Iran’s security concerns are as legitimate as those of others in the region. However, even that could prove to be a tall order, particularly if the negotiations to revive the nuclear accord fail.

Nevertheless, that may be the only realistic way of putting Iran’s support for militants in various Arab countries, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah Shiite militia, various pro-Iranian paramilitary groups in Iraq, and Houthi rebels in Yemen, as well as the Islamic republic’s ballistic missiles program – the two major concerns of Israel and the Gulf states — on an agenda to which Iran is a participating party.

Ms. Kaye argues that “despite these serious obstacles, it is important to present a vision and pathway for an inclusive, cooperative process when a political opening emerges, or when a crisis erupts of such severe magnitude that even bitter adversaries may consider options that were previously unthinkable.”

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

Jawad Falak

With much fanfare and aplomb, the Indian Government unveiled its purported indigenous aircraft carrier INS VIKRANT on 2 September. The opportunity was used by both the Indian Government and its subservient media to showcase Indian prowess as a major defense products powerhouse. However, a closer look will instead substantiate that the Vikrant is actually a negation of all grandiose claims about the strength of the Indian defense industry and more of an emblem of its weaknesses.

First of all the term indigenous may not be at all suitable to be used for VIKRANT. As per Indian claims, 80-85% of the carrier is indigenous but that is more by weight than by value. The 15-20% of the rest could be called the technological core or the essence of the Carrier consisting of weaponry such as guns & missiles, sensors, data/information fusion, navigation and other paraphernalia enhancing situational awareness which actually make up most of the costs are of foreign origin and have been imported. According to the Indian media website The Wire, 50% of the equipment relevant to the propulsion aspect of the Carrier while 70% equipment relating to the fighting capability is imported.

Secondly, meeting time deadlines and being cost effective is one of the essential requirements of an efficient defense industry but the Indian defense setup seems to be highly lacking in this regard. Taking the case of INS VIKRANT, it has been delayed by nearly seven years and afflicted with a six times increase in its costs,from its original 2003 projected cost of Rs 3,216 Crores to over Rs 20,000 Crores currently. This is not the only project inflicted with time delay and cost overrun. The Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, another so-called indigenous product but also filled with imported parts, took more than 30 years to reach operationalisation. Another Indian defense program, the Arjun Tank also took a whopping 30 years plus for development. Even then in all cases, the end product left a lot to be desired.

The LCA Tejas was derided by both the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy while the Arjun Tank’s feasibility led to the Indian military only inducting just 124 tanks into service by mid-2018 which have continued to face severe technical issues leaving 75 percent of the units totally non operational. VIKRANT also seems to be not far different in this regard, it has been launched without its Aviation Flight Complex (AFC) that is critical to operating its combat air arm. The AFC, which is the electronic suite Vikrant uses to detect and manage the Ship’s aircraft when in the air, has been designed by the Russian (again negating the indigenous claim) is unlikely to be fully installed and functional till the end of 2023. This too is also a pre-Ukraine war estimate as the current sanctions on Russia will further complicate the delivery of the AFC which raises further questions about VIKRANT’s battle worthiness in the future.

But one of the most glaring drawbacks of VIKRANT is its complement of aircraft or more correctly, the lack of it. VIKRANT is making do with 12-15 MiG-29K/KUBs until the Indian Navy finally decides on whether to acquire new foriegn off the shelf platforms (Rafale or F18) or make a naval version of the Tejas. The MiG29K in service are notorious as per Indian sources for being “operationally inefficient, with an appallingly low serviceability rate and the inability to deliver specified payloads to their declared ranges with a full fuel load”. Furthermore, VIKRANT is equipped with a ski-jump system which forces its jets to launch using their own power which further restricts the amount of fuel, missiles and bombs they can carry into combat. Another drawback observed during sea trials is that VIKRANT experienced heavy pitching in high seas.The said factor will not only affect speed and stability of VIKRANT but will also increase difficulty in take off and landing ofCarrier based aircraft.

The whole VIKRANT project itself is under question by Indian intellectuals even if one ignores the drawbacks of the program. Bharat Karnad who is an emeritus professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi has stated that “ the Indian aircraft carrier-making capability is coming to fruition just when the age of the large ships is coming to a close”. Indian critics have highlighted that INS VIKRANT is likely to become a headache for Indian maritime security as not only will it necessitate more and more funds for maintenance but also require additional assets for protection as it will become a lucrative target for hostile elements. These assets will have to be diverted from other responsibilities which will lead to gaps in Indian defenses.

At the end, it can be stated that the INS VIKRANT seems to be more of a vanity project that has tried to portray failure as a sign of national pride. However the end result seems to be more detrimental to the country’s stature rather than being beneficial. 

The author is a M.Phil from National Defence University (NDU) Islamabad in International Relations and routinely writes on current affairs.