Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer

The return of great-power competition has become one of the defining features of contemporary international politics. From the battlefields of Ukraine to the contested waters of the South China Sea and the strategic tensions surrounding Taiwan, the world is witnessing a renewed struggle among major powers. For many scholars and policymakers seeking to understand these developments, the work of John J. Mearsheimer offers a compelling framework. His influential theory of offensive realism, most notably articulated in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, provides a sobering explanation of why rivalries among powerful states persist despite economic interdependence, diplomatic engagement and the lessons of history.

Mearsheimer argues that the international system is inherently anarchic. In other words, there is no central authority above states capable of guaranteeing their security. As a result, every major power must rely primarily on its own capabilities for survival. In such an environment, uncertainty about the intentions of other states becomes a permanent feature of international politics. Even states with peaceful intentions today may develop hostile ambitions tomorrow. Consequently, great powers are compelled to seek greater military, economic and strategic strength in order to ensure their security.

This pursuit of security, however, often generates insecurity for others. When one state increases its military capabilities or expands its influence, rival states perceive a potential threat and respond in kind. The outcome is a cycle of competition that can be difficult to escape. According to Mearsheimer, this dynamic constitutes the central tragedy of great-power politics. States do not necessarily seek conflict because they are aggressive or irrational; rather, the structure of the international system pushes them toward competition.

The contemporary rivalry among the United States, Russia and China reflects many of these assumptions. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has remained the world’s most powerful state. Yet the emergence of China as a major economic and military power has transformed the strategic landscape. Beijing’s rapid economic growth, technological advancement and expanding military capabilities have led many American policymakers to view China as the principal challenger to US primacy.

From a Mearsheimerian perspective, this outcome was predictable. He has long argued that a rising China would seek to dominate Asia in much the same way the United States achieved regional dominance in the Western Hemisphere. As China’s influence grows, neighbouring states and the United States are likely to balance against it. The intensifying competition in the Indo-Pacific region, the strengthening of security partnerships and the growing strategic importance of Taiwan all reflect this broader logic of power politics.

Russia’s role in this triangular rivalry further illustrates Mearsheimer’s arguments. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western observers anticipated a more cooperative relationship between Russia and the West. However, disputes over NATO expansion, regional security arrangements and spheres of influence gradually deepened mistrust. Moscow increasingly viewed Western policies as a threat to its security interests, while Western governments interpreted Russian actions as evidence of revisionist ambitions.

The war in Ukraine has become one of the most visible manifestations of these tensions. While interpretations of the conflict differ sharply, Mearsheimer has consistently argued that security concerns and geopolitical competition played a central role in shaping Russian behaviour. His position has generated significant debate, yet it reflects his broader conviction that great powers react forcefully when they perceive strategic encroachments near their borders.

The evolving relationship between Russia and China also deserves attention. Although historical mistrust and differing national interests remain, both countries share concerns regarding American global influence. Their growing cooperation in areas such as energy, diplomacy and defence reflects a common desire to counterbalance US power. Yet offensive realism suggests that such partnerships should not be viewed as permanent alliances based on shared values. Rather, they are strategic arrangements shaped by shifting calculations of interest and power.

One of the most striking aspects of Mearsheimer’s theory is its pessimism regarding the prospects for lasting harmony among great powers. Liberal thinkers often emphasise the role of international institutions, economic interdependence and democratic governance in reducing conflict. Mearsheimer does not deny their importance, but he argues that they cannot fundamentally eliminate the pressures created by an anarchic international system. When vital security interests are perceived to be at stake, states tend to prioritise power and survival over broader ideals.

The relevance of this argument is increasingly apparent in today’s world. Economic ties between the United States and China remain extensive, yet strategic rivalry continues to deepen. Diplomatic engagement between Russia and Western countries has persisted at various moments, but profound security disagreements remain unresolved. The expectation that globalisation alone would usher in an era of permanent peace now appears far less convincing than it did during the optimistic years following the Cold War.

For middle and smaller powers, the renewed era of great-power competition presents significant challenges. Countries across Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East are navigating a complex environment in which strategic alignments are becoming more fluid and contested. The ability to maintain diplomatic flexibility while safeguarding national interests has become increasingly important.

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics remains influential because it offers a stark reminder about the enduring realities of international affairs. Mearsheimer’s central insight is that competition among powerful states is not merely the product of individual leaders or temporary disputes. It is rooted in the structure of the international system itself. Whether one fully accepts his conclusions or not, the ongoing rivalry among the United States, Russia and China suggests that the struggle for power, influence and security remains as central to global politics today as it has been throughout modern history.