Dr Abed Akbari

In the history of nations, individuals sometimes transcend their own eras to become an integral part of a country’s strategic memory. In such cases, evaluating them is not merely passing judgment on the record of a ruler, but rather an attempt to comprehend a school of thought that has permeated the political institutions, decision-making culture, and a nation’s perception of the world. The martyrdom of Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei belongs to this very category. The answer to the question of what the Islamic Republic of Iran will do in his absence is directly linked to another question: to what extent has the doctrine formulated and institutionalized by Ayatollah Khamenei over more than three decades transcended the will of a single individual and evolved into the strategic intellect of the Islamic Republic?

In conventional international relations literature, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic is often interpreted through the lens of ideology—as if all of Tehran’s decisions can be explained solely by referencing the slogans of the Islamic Revolution. While this narrative captures a fragment of reality, it falls short of explaining the logic behind Iran’s foreign policy. Policy, as the long-standing tradition of Persian political thought testifies, has always been the product of the relationship between ideals and pragmatism. From Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk’s Siyasatnama (The Book of Government) to the reflections of contemporary thinkers, the survival of the state, the preservation of authority, and the safeguarding of independence have been deemed the primary conditions for realizing any grand ideal. In this sense, the legacy of Ayatollah Khamenei should be sought not in the clash between idealism and realism, but in the endeavor to synthesize the two.

His strategic worldview was anchored in a fundamental premise: the international system remains an arena of unequal distribution of power, and states live under the shadow of the balance of power before they live under the shadow of legal frameworks. From this perspective, security is not a gift bestowed by great powers upon others; security is the product of a nation’s capacity to safeguard its own independence. This understanding was not merely an abstract international relations theory, but arose from Iran’s historical experience—a country that, over the past two centuries, has repeatedly paid the price of weakness, dependency, and foreign intervention, viewing independence not as an abstract concept, but as historical capital.

Consequently, the concept of “independence” in Ayatollah Khamenei’s thought was more than a political slogan; it was the backbone of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. Independence meant the right to make decisions freely on national issues, without the will of external powers overriding the will of the nation. It was on the basis of this understanding that the development of defense capabilities, self-reliance in strategic industries, investment in indigenous technologies, and the reinforcement of deterrence became indispensable components of national strategy. In this logic, a country that abdicates its means of self-defense to others will sooner or later surrender its political decision-making power as well.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s mistrust of the United States is also understandable within this framework. Rather than stemming from temporary hostilities, this mistrust was rooted in a reading of great power behavior, where international politics is organized around interests and the balance of power rather than trust. From this perspective, negotiation was never rejected, but it only held value when conducted from a position of strength. Diplomacy, in this framework, was not an alternative to power, but an extension of it—just as Persian statecraft has traditionally held that a lasting peace is only established when backed by authority.

The Islamic Republic’s nuclear dossier was the clearest manifestation of this outlook. Accepting dialogue and agreement did not mean abandoning the components of power. On the contrary, the premise was that political agreements, no matter how significant, cannot substitute for deterrence. Therefore, even during the years of active diplomacy, the development of the country’s defense capabilities was pursued with equal vigor. This synchrony stemmed from the belief that while agreements are subject to political shifts, national power is the only safeguard whose longevity remains entirely in the hands of the nation itself.

Within this same framework, the Islamic Republic’s regional policy also gains meaning. What was perceived from the outside merely as the expansion of Iranian influence was, in the strategic logic of the Islamic Republic, the creation of “strategic depth” for a country situated in one of the world’s most turbulent regions. Supporting the Axis of Resistance, forging alliances with aligned forces, and striving to prevent threats from establishing themselves near Iran’s borders were components of a policy aimed at raising the cost of any aggression against the country. Undoubtedly, there are differing views regarding the consequences of this strategy. Some see it as a factor elevating Iran’s geopolitical standing, while others emphasize its economic and political costs. Yet, irrespective of these judgments, it is difficult to overlook the role of this policy in reshaping the security dynamics of the region.

Another prominent feature of Ayatollah Khamenei’s strategic thinking was his attention to the gradual transformation of the global order. Years before speaking of a “post-Western world” became commonplace in international relations literature, he emphasized the gradual end of the monopoly of power and the movement of the global system toward more multipolar arrangements. Accordingly, the policy of expanding relations with Asian powers, developing regional cooperation, and diversifying international partners was pursued. Of course, this policy was not immune to the constraints of the real world, as no power, whether in the East or the West, sacrifices its national interests for another. However, the core strategy was to reduce reliance on a single pole and increase Iran’s room for maneuver in the international arena.

Nonetheless, evaluating any strategic doctrine is not possible solely by counting gains or costs. During Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership, Iran managed to raise its deterrent capacity to a level where direct military threats against the country involve far more complex calculations than in the past. Concurrently, the Iranian economy faced extensive sanctions, financial constraints, and difficulties in interacting with the global economy. These two realities must be viewed alongside one another, rather than against each other; for foreign policy is not the art of choosing between easy options, but of navigating through hardships.

Perhaps the most significant legacy of Ayatollah Khamenei lies not in any single decision, but in the institutionalization of a certain “strategic culture”—a culture that prioritizes independence over dependence, regards deterrence as the prerequisite for peace, and views diplomacy as effective only when backed by national power. This culture is tied less to an individual and more to Iran’s historical experience, its geopolitical position, and the political elite’s perception of the international environment.

For this reason, the martyrdom of Ayatollah Khamenei will not mark the end of the doctrine he formulated and institutionalized in foreign policy over many years. Strategies, when linked with a nation’s geography, history, and security memory, outlive their architects. If so, the primary legacy of Ayatollah Khamenei is not a collection of temporary decisions, but the consolidation of an understanding of foreign policy in which independence, authority, and deterrence constitute the three pillars of Iran’s national security—an understanding that will likely remain one of the most vital foundations for thinking about Iran’s place in the future world order.

Dr Abed Akbari

Deputy at the Strategic Directorate of the Iranian Presidency

Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer

Political ideas often outlive the societies in which they were first developed. They survive because they address recurring questions about power, institutions and change. Few twentieth-century thinkers illustrate this better than Leon Trotsky. Although his theories emerged from revolutionary Russia, the debates he initiated continue to resonate wherever states struggle with institutional weakness, political fragmentation and the challenge of reform. For Pakistan, Trotsky’s writings are not a political blueprint to be followed, but they offer a useful lens through which to examine the country’s own institutional evolution.

Trotsky remains one of the most influential yet controversial figures in modern political thought. A leading figure in the 1917 Russian Revolution, Trotsky developed the theory of Permanent Revolution, arguing that societies experiencing incomplete political and economic transformation could not rely on gradual or isolated reforms. Instead, he believed political and social change was an ongoing process requiring continuous institutional development. While many aspects of his revolutionary programme remain subjects of historical debate, his broader concern with political stagnation, bureaucratic concentration of power and institutional decay continues to attract scholarly attention.

Perhaps even more significant than his theory of Permanent Revolution was Trotsky’s criticism of bureaucratic authoritarianism. Following the consolidation of power under Joseph Stalin, Trotsky argued that revolutionary ideals had been overshadowed by an expanding bureaucracy that increasingly concentrated authority in a narrow political elite. In his view, institutions become less effective when they cease to encourage accountability, open debate and public participation. Whether or not one agrees with his conclusions, his warning about excessive bureaucratic centralisation remains relevant to discussions of governance across the world.

Pakistan’s political experience differs fundamentally from the circumstances of early Soviet Russia. Pakistan is a constitutional parliamentary republic with its own legal traditions, democratic institutions and social complexities. Nevertheless, like many developing states, it has experienced recurring tensions between political continuity and institutional reform. Governments have changed, policies have shifted and economic priorities have evolved, yet structural governance challenges have often persisted.

One of Pakistan’s enduring difficulties is not the absence of constitutional institutions but the uneven performance of those institutions. Frequent political polarisation has diverted attention from long-term policy planning. Successive governments have launched ambitious programmes in education, health, taxation and economic management, yet implementation has frequently been inconsistent. Administrative continuity has often been interrupted by political transitions, reducing the effectiveness of otherwise promising initiatives.

Trotsky’s criticism of bureaucracy invites a broader question that extends beyond ideology: how can state institutions remain efficient, responsive and accountable? The answer lies not in revolutionary upheaval but in strengthening the rule of law, improving public administration and ensuring that institutions operate according to constitutional principles rather than political expediency.

Pakistan’s civil service remains one of the country’s most important state institutions. It possesses considerable professional expertise, yet concerns about administrative delays, overlapping jurisdictions and procedural complexity continue to affect governance. Modern states increasingly rely on efficient public administration, digital governance and evidence-based policymaking. Administrative reform therefore becomes not merely a managerial objective but an essential requirement for democratic stability and economic growth.

Another area where Trotsky’s analysis retains indirect relevance concerns political participation. Healthy democracies require political competition that remains within constitutional boundaries. They also require opposition parties capable of contributing constructively to national policymaking rather than viewing politics exclusively as a zero-sum contest. Pakistan’s democratic future depends upon strengthening parliamentary processes, encouraging issue-based politics and developing greater consensus on national priorities such as education, energy security, fiscal reform and climate resilience.

Economic governance presents an equally important challenge. Pakistan’s recurring balance-of-payments crises, dependence on external financial assistance and limited industrial diversification underline the need for sustained structural reform. Political instability often discourages long-term investment and weakens policy consistency. Successful economies generally demonstrate continuity in economic planning regardless of changes in government. This principle owes less to any particular ideology than to institutional maturity.

Education represents another critical dimension of institutional development. Countries that have achieved sustained economic progress have generally invested heavily in human capital, scientific research and technical skills. Pakistan possesses a young and dynamic population whose potential can only be realised through consistent investment in education, vocational training and innovation. Strengthening universities, improving school standards and expanding opportunities for research should remain central components of national development strategy.

Equally important is the relationship between citizens and public institutions. Public confidence grows when institutions demonstrate transparency, impartiality and professional competence. Judicial efficiency, regulatory consistency and effective local government all contribute to strengthening democratic legitimacy. Institutional credibility cannot be established through rhetoric alone; it emerges from consistent performance over time.

Pakistan’s foreign policy environment also requires institutional coherence. Situated at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, Pakistan faces a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape characterised by strategic competition, shifting economic partnerships and evolving regional security dynamics. Long-term foreign policy benefits from policy continuity supported by professional diplomatic institutions capable of balancing national interests with changing international realities.

The principal lesson Pakistan may draw from Trotsky is therefore not his revolutionary prescriptions but his concern about institutional stagnation. Modern governance depends upon the continuous improvement of public institutions, the strengthening of democratic accountability and the ability of governments to adapt to changing economic and social conditions. States that neglect institutional reform often find themselves repeatedly confronting the same structural problems despite frequent changes in political leadership.

Pakistan today possesses substantial strengths: a resilient society, an entrepreneurial private sector, experienced public institutions and significant strategic importance. Transforming these assets into sustained national progress requires political stability, constitutional continuity and an unwavering commitment to institutional excellence. Reform should be understood not as a moment of political disruption but as a continuous process of improving governance, expanding opportunity and strengthening public trust.

History rarely offers ready-made solutions for contemporary challenges. Yet it does provide valuable perspectives. Leon Trotsky’s enduring contribution lies less in the revolutionary programme he championed than in the questions he raised about power, bureaucracy and institutional vitality. For Pakistan, the path forward is neither revolution nor ideological confrontation. It lies in patient institution-building, effective governance, democratic accountability and long-term policy consistency. Those remain the foundations upon which stable, prosperous and confident nations are ultimately built.

Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer

Assistant Professor Pakistan Studies

Imperial College of business Studies Lahore

[email protected]

Ghazala Anbreen

The sea surface temperatures are constantly rising because of increased emissions. There are different factors which are responsible for this. The heat is generated from unlined waste dump sites. Unfortunately, the burning of crop residues is also a very big source of increase in temperature in Pakistan. Another major  source is vehicular emissions. The heat caused by Euro 2 fuel is  more than that caused by Euro 5. Therefore, switching to Euro 5, cleaner fuel standards is very necessary and is the dire need of the time in order to counter this heat problem. Factories also need to have a proper control as regards the environmental certificates. Electrostatic precipitators with the towers should be in working condition.

 When we go to the suburbs of big cities there are small plants which burn plastic. Because of the emissions of fine particulate matter (PM 2.5), this burning of plastic becomes the reason of generating toxic substances as, for instance, dioxins and furans. These are highly dangerous because a lot of heat is generated through them. For environment they have a severe detrimental effect.

These dioxins can travel through the atmosphere. As a result they poison the crops, water and soil and contaminate them. Thus the food chain is affected and human health is at stake. In Karachi some people have died because of heat stroke.The number of patients suffering from heat strokes admitted in hospitals are increasing all over the country.

 Despite the fact that global warming is a reality, for a comfortable living, controlling the sources of heat generation is essential.  We have to look at our waste disposal mechanisms also. The unmanaged waste is also a reason for the increase in temperature. These create methane gas which leads to global warming. We have to check it meticulously whether our waste has the capability of burning at 1100 degree centigrade. Attaining the target of zero waste to landfill can be possible when it is seen how much waste we throw in the landfills. In general, much of  the waste in most of the countries all over the globe is thrown to the  engineered landfills, as it is the cheapest and safest method of waste disposal. The gas from these landfills is used for energy production. However, achieving the target of Near zero waste to energy can become a reality. And for this purpose the training of the people, (the consumers) is essential. The people should be consistently reminded through regular awareness campaigns that they must throw the waste in separate designated bins only.

To sum up, resorting to cleaner fuel standards, minimizing vehicular emissions, better waste management techniques,  regulations regarding industrial controls and proper enforcement and stopping open crop residual burning, all these measures can help countering the problem of rising temperature to a great extent. These are in our control and with the use of proper technology we can help achieve this for a better future for our younger generations.