Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
For more than a decade, Syria has stood as one of the most complex theatres of conflict in the modern Middle East. What began as a popular uprising in 2011 soon turned into a civil war influenced by regional rivalries, ideological divides and major-power involvement. Today, as the conflict’s intensity has reduced in many areas, an important question hangs over the region: what will a post-Assad Syria look like, and how does the United States intend to shape that outcome? Assessing Washington’s policy demands a close look at its objectives, hesitations, and the contradictory pressures shaping its choices.
From the earliest phase of the Syrian uprising, the United States spoke plainly about its desire to see Bashar al-Assad step aside. The reasoning was built on the belief that a government accused of mass atrocities could not credibly remain at the helm of national reconstruction. Yet words did not translate into decisive action. Washington oscillated between calls for political transition and caution about deeper involvement. This hesitancy allowed both the conflict and regional actors to evolve in ways that constrained American choices. Russia’s military entry in 2015 fundamentally changed the balance of power, securing Assad’s position and limiting the feasibility of any transition that excluded him.
As a result, the United States found itself compelled to adjust its expectations. Rather than pursuing abrupt regime change, Washington shifted towards more modest aims: containing extremist groups, supporting local partners in the northeast, and applying economic pressure on Damascus. The use of sanctions, most notably through the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, was framed as an attempt to hold the government accountable for human rights violations. But these sanctions also complicated the daily lives of ordinary Syrians, added strain to an already decimated economy, and pushed Damascus to deepen its reliance on Moscow and Tehran.
This approach raises an important question: can the United States influence a post-Assad future without engaging meaningfully in Syria’s political landscape? So far, Washington’s strategy has rested on the assumption that prolonged pressure will either force change within the ruling elite or motivate external actors to support a political transition. However, the past several years suggest that pressure alone has not yielded significant movement inside Damascus. The Syrian government has weathered economic crises, territorial losses, and international isolation, yet it has not shown willingness to negotiate a transition that threatens its core leadership.
Meanwhile, regional dynamics are shifting around Syria. A number of Arab states have reopened diplomatic channels with Damascus, arguing that isolation only strengthened external powers and prolonged instability. Syria’s readmission to the Arab League marked a significant symbolic step, even if it did not bring immediate change. These states believe that reintegration could encourage some level of reform, or at least allow for cooperation on pressing issues such as drug trafficking, refugee return and cross-border security. Washington, however, remains wary. It argues that reintegration without accountability risks legitimizing a government tied to widespread abuses. Yet it also recognizes that it cannot simply dictate the policies of regional partners who are dealing with the direct consequences of the conflict.
The United States faces a dilemma: it wants to prevent the rehabilitation of Assad on the world stage, yet it also wants stability in a region strained by refugees, militant networks and economic decline. Reconciling these goals requires policy clarity, something Washington has struggled to provide. Its military presence, confined mainly to the northeast, focuses on preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State group and supporting Kurdish-led forces. This has created an awkward balance. These local forces seek recognition and long-term security guarantees, while neighboring Turkey views them as a direct threat. The United States, caught between these competing interests, has tried to maintain a fragile equilibrium. But this has not translated into a broader political vision for Syria’s future.
Another dimension of the post-Assad question is reconstruction. Syria’s physical destruction is immense: cities such as Aleppo and Homs require decades of rebuilding. Infrastructure across the country needs substantial investment. Yet Washington maintains that no reconstruction funding will flow without political progress. This stance is intended to deny Damascus the resources to consolidate its rule. However, it also limits opportunities for stabilizing affected regions and improving humanitarian conditions. Countries like China and the Gulf states have expressed conditional interest in reconstruction, but political uncertainty and Western sanctions discourage large-scale commitments. As long as there is no agreement on Syria’s political direction, reconstruction remains frozen.
In this context, the notion of “post-Assad Syria” has itself become ambiguous. For some, it refers to a complete political transition in which Assad steps down as part of a negotiated settlement. For others, it means preparing for a long-term arrangement where the state remains under its current leadership, but where reforms and power-sharing might gradually emerge. Washington has not clearly articulated which of these outcomes it considers both desirable and realistic. This lack of clarity hampers its diplomatic engagement and limits its ability to influence regional partners.
Yet the United States still retains some leverage. Its partnership with local forces in the northeast gives it influence over a critical region. Its ties with European allies ensure that sanctions and diplomatic pressure remain coordinated. And its relations with Turkey, Jordan, Israel and the Gulf states make it an unavoidable actor in any regional negotiation. The challenge is to use this leverage constructively. A policy guided primarily by obstruction—blocking reconstruction, discouraging reintegration and maintaining sanctions—may prolong the status quo without opening space for meaningful change.
If Washington seeks to shape Syria’s future, it must consider a more comprehensive framework. First, it needs a clearer political objective. If the goal is a negotiated transition, then diplomatic efforts should focus on creating the conditions for meaningful dialogue among Syrian actors, rather than assuming external pressure alone will compel change. If the goal is incremental reform within the existing power structure, then Washington must acknowledge that outright regime change is unlikely in the near term and adjust its rhetoric accordingly. Second, the United States must decide how it views Syria’s reintegration into regional institutions. Although it opposes normalization without political concessions, it cannot ignore that Arab states are proceeding regardless. Rather than standing apart, Washington could attempt to work with these states to ensure that reintegration is linked to measurable steps: improved humanitarian access, reductions in arbitrary detentions, cooperation on refugee issues and curbs on illicit drug networks. Such an approach recognizes the realities of regional diplomacy while retaining pressure for gradual change. Third, there is the question of reconstruction. Completely withholding reconstruction funding may not produce the intended political results, but unconditional funding would strengthen the current leadership. A middle path could involve channeling aid directly to local communities through international agencies, bypassing central authorities. This method has been used in other post-conflict settings and could help rebuild essential services without reinforcing the structures that contributed to the crisis. Finally, Washington must reassess its military posture. Its presence in the northeast has provided stability but also created long-term uncertainties, especially regarding relations with Turkey and Iran-backed groups. A gradual shift from direct military involvement to a more diplomatic and developmental role may prove more sustainable. But such a shift requires careful planning and assurances to local partners, who fear being abandoned to regional adversaries.
The question of Syria’s international integration cannot be separated from these wider considerations. A country devastated by war cannot remain permanently isolated if lasting stability is the goal. At the same time, reintegration must not become a reward for impunity. Balancing these objectives requires patient diplomacy, regional coordination and a realistic understanding of Syria’s political landscape.
As the conflict enters a new phase, the United States has an opportunity to re-examine its policies and align them with the changing realities of the region. The era of sweeping calls for regime change has passed. What remains is the difficult work of shaping a path that reduces suffering, encourages political openness and guides Syria back into a regional order where its people can rebuild their lives. The question is whether Washington can move beyond reactive measures towards a coherent strategy that acknowledges both its limitations and its responsibilities. Only then can it contribute meaningfully to a future in which Syria finds a place within the international community without abandoning the principles of accountability and justice.
