he issue of Cyprus remains unsettled because the UN Security Council in its resolution of March 4, 1964, unfairly gave only Greek Cypriots the right to represent the whole of the island as the ‘Government of Cyprus.’

Ishtiaq Ahmad

After a long struggle against the British Empire, which had many twists and turns along the way, the Indian Subcontinent was partitioned in 1947. This led to the emergence of India and Pakistan as two separate states. In the eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus, however, the British colonial administration opted for a different course: the establishment in 1960 of a Partnership Republic between its majority Greek and minority Turkish communities. But it collapsed within three years, as the Greek side refused to comply with its founding principle of political equality.

These contrasting solutions of Partition in British India and Partnership in Cyprus offer interesting parallels, in both pre-and post-colonial periods. India and Pakistan have evolved as independent states, though in different trajectories, in the past 76 years. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, on the other hand, have lived separately since the breakup of the Partnership Republic in 1963. This division has reinforced since the 1974 intervention by Turkiye in the island and the subsequent establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983.

In the past half century, consistent international efforts to amicably resolve the Cyprus conflict, which has reinforced the island’s division. The only aberration during the period is that the Greek side has monopolized the status of the Republic of Cyprus and solely enjoyed the fruits of EU membership since 2004. Despite this injustice, however, the TRNC continues to survive, with a functioning democratic but under dire economic conditions.

The current division in Cyprus, with little prospect for a unified solution, begs the question as to why the British did not divide the island into two separate states along the lines of the preceding partition of India. To answer this question, let us review the run-up to the Partition of British India and its co-relation the events that led to the establishment of the Partnership Republic in Cyprus.

To start with, British colonialism in both India and Cyprus was preceded by centuries of Muslim rule, including the Sultans/Mughals (1206-1858) and the Ottomans (1571-1878), respectively. The majority communities in both cases, the Hindus in India and the Greeks in Cyprus, were the subjects of the minority rule. governance. The Orthodox Christian Greeks were the subjects before as well under the Catholic Venetians. The Ottomans, in fact, liberated them from centuries of religious persecution.

Like elsewhere, British colonialism thrived on divide and rule. In order to sustain its control over India and Cyprus, the colonial administration victimized the former minority rulers, the Turks, and favored the former majority subjects, the Greeks. This paved the way for Hindu revivalism in India and Greek Hellenism in Cyprus, which, in turn, contributed to the demise of colonial rule.

The majority Greeks and Hindus turned against their benefactor, including in violent ways, even while the minority Indian Muslims and Turkish Cypriots sought a peaceful transition from colonial rule. Having ruled for centuries, their respective demand for separate electorates and political equality in the post-colonial constitutional structures in India and Cyprus made perfect sense.

The Indian National Congress, instead, sought Hindu domination of Indian politics after the end of colonial rule, rejecting successive British offers to accommodate the Muslim demand for separate electorates. It even refused to accept the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan, which proposed a loose federation between the Hindu- and Muslim-majority states sharing foreign, defense and communication affairs. Consequently, the Indian Muslim League under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah was left with no option but to translate the Pakistan Resolution of 1940 into action.

In Cyprus, the colonial administration was able to address the Turkish Cypriot demand for equal political and constitutional rights. The Zurich and London accords, which established the Republic of Cyprus, were deliberately structured to establish and maintain “a delicate but immutable equilibrium between the rights and interests” of the two Greek and Turkish communities. The international agreements of Alliance and Guarantee helped accommodate another unique aspect of the Cyprus situation, which was absent in India’s case: that of the existence of two motherlands for the two Cypriot nations, Turkey and Greece, and their influence in Cyprus.

In addition to Great Britain, which was allowed to retain two sovereign military bases on the island under the Treaty of Establishment, Turkey and Greece became the security guarantors of Cyprus. However, despite such extensive political and security arrangements, the Republic collapsed within three years due to Greek Cypriot unwillingness to share power. The 13 amendments to the Constitution proposed by then-Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios 1963 sought to create a unitary state in Cyprus, a forerunner to Enosis. In fact, the Greek Cypriot paramilitary, EOKA, had already waged a decade-long Hellenic campaign for uniting Cyprus with Greece against the colonial administration. Its successor, EOKA-B, continued this deadly mission against the Turkish Cypriot people until the 1974 Turkish intervention.

On the basis of above discussion, we can argue that it was the fear of Hindu domination that forced the Indian Muslim League to demand Pakistan as a separate homeland for Indian Muslims. On the other hand, the Partnership Republic collapsed due to the Hellenic ambition of Greek Cypriots for Enosis, the island’s union with motherland Greece.

It is clear that the establishment of two separate republics for its Greek and Turkish communities right at the start could have prevented communal hostilities after the breakup of the Partnership Republic in 1963 and the perpetuation of the conflict over the last several decades. These two republics have progressed smoothly with security guarantees provided by their respective motherlands, Greece and Turkey.

While the blame for the collapse of the Partnership Republic falls squarely on the shoulders of the Greek Cypriot leadership, the UK is also at least partly responsible for not doing enough afterwards. After all, as a former colonial power and guarantor state, it was legally and morally bound to intervene on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot minority to prevent inter-communal violence till 1974 and conflict resolution thereafter.

Why did the colonial administration not realize before withdrawing from Cyprus and establishing a federation there that the Greek side, with the paramilitary EOKA in its midst, would not allow the Turkish Cypriots to exercise their right of political equality in a federal republic? It was but natural for this precarious constitutional arrangement to collapse instantly, which it did in 1963.

However, since then, it seems the UK has been more interested in the survival of its two sovereign military bases in Cyprus than any political settlement of the issue. Perhaps, given the strategic location of the island and British interests in the Middle East, the political stalemate in Cyprus suits the British, notwithstanding the gravity of its political and economic cost for the Turkish Cypriots. Meanwhile, the Greek side continues to draw political and economic benefits on behalf of the entire island internationally, especially as EU member.

Last but not least, that the British empire sowed the seeds of conflict in post-colonial states across Asia and Africa is a common belief. Kashmir and Cyprus remain its two bitter legacies. The UN is also to blame here. In the case of Kashmir, it has failed to implement Security Council resolution for holding a plebiscite to determine the right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people. The issue of Cyprus remains unsettled because the UN Security Council in its resolution of March 4, 1964, unfairly gave only Greek Cypriots the right to represent the whole of the island as the ‘Government of Cyprus.’

To be continued.

The writer is an international relations expert.

Comment

Ansar M Bhatti

Political parties are intensifying their election campaigns in anticipation of the forthcoming announcement of the election schedule by the Election Commission. Notably, the PML-N appears particularly optimistic about its prospects in the upcoming elections, in stark contrast to the PPP, which faces challenges in conducting its campaign. The PPP expresses reservations about its ability to secure favor from the Establishment, believing that it has not successfully garnered their support.

Hence we often hear from them about the ‘foul play’ on the part of the powers-that-be, which, according to PPP, want to keep it out of the parliament. Even if it is so, the PPP should not worry about it at all as it claims to be a party of the underprivileged having deep roots among masses. It also claims to have done a lot for the have-nots, therefore in this case it should not be a matter of great concern for them even if the Establishment has chosen to be on the side of the PML-N!!

The PML-N is poised to encounter significant hurdles in the days ahead within the complex landscape of Pakistani politics. Traditionally, political alliances among key political parties in Pakistan materialize post-elections, with the party securing a simple or absolute majority determining partnerships based on preferences. However, in a departure from this norm, the PML-N appears to have entered into a pre-election alliance with the MQM. Speculation abounds regarding whether this collaboration was a strategic decision or if external factors compelled the party into this alliance. Regardless of the impetus behind this unconventional move, it is evident that the alliance carries potential risks for the PML-N both leading up to and following the elections. Moreover, it appears to be a marriage of convenience rather than an alliance, underscoring its inherent fragility.

There are strong indications that the PML-N is poised to lead the next government in collaboration with the MQM and a few other political parties. Efforts are underway to orchestrate a political alliance between the PML-N and the recently established IPP. However, if this alliance materializes, concerns arise that the PML-N might face challenges in completing its term.

Recognizing the potential risks, sensible voices within the party are actively working to counter this move. Some leaders advocate for exploring a strategic seat adjustment with the IPP instead of forming a comprehensive alliance. Nevertheless, a significant majority within the party opposes even the seat adjustment option.

The likelihood of Nawaz Sharif assuming the office of the prime minister for the fourth time remains a formidable challenge. The intricacies of this process become particularly apparent when considering the timeline associated with the election schedule. Upon the announcement of the election schedule, candidates are required to submit their nomination papers. This crucial step is anticipated to conclude in December or early January.

However, Nawaz Sharif’s ability to file his nomination papers hinges on the timely resolution of his appeals seeking acquittal. If the decision on his appeals is delayed, it could potentially impede his ability to file nomination papers within the stipulated timeframe. In such a scenario, it becomes increasingly likely that Nawaz Sharif may opt to participate in by-elections. Nevertheless, this decision would be contingent on the court’s verdict.

The timing of the court decision holds significant weight, as a delayed outcome could necessitate the appointment of an interim prime minister as a stopgap arrangement. As reports suggest, there is still a kind of disagreement between the PML N and the Establishment. PML N wants at least a simple majority in order to steer clear the country out of existing political and economic mess. It is however yet to get a positive nod in this regard.

The PTI, contrastingly, remains entangled in the repercussions of strained relations with influential forces. During Imran Khan’s tenure in power, he seemingly overlooked the crucial role played by the Establishment in propelling him to office and sustaining his position. Over time, an illusionary sense of genuine popularity seemed to engulf him, leading him to believe that his three years in office had significantly improved the lives of the less privileged in the country. Unfortunately, this misconception exacted a substantial toll, as he found himself facing the consequences of a misjudged assumption.

However, the undeniable truth persists that the abrupt removal of his government and the subsequent rise of PDM figures triggered a significant change in public sentiment, ultimately swaying support towards the PTI leader. The subsequent lackluster performance of the PDM not only reversed Imran Khan’s status from a political underdog to a hero but also cemented a narrative that the PDM leadership continues to grapple with, a mistake that will haunt them indefinitely.

The pivotal question at hand revolves around the prospective trajectory of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and its charismatic leader, Imran Khan. Analyzing Imran Khan’s political future reveals a stark reality: his chances of clinching victory in upcoming elections seem remote, contingent upon a significant discord between the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Establishment. The PTI’s ascendancy to the forefront becomes plausible only when such differences reach a threshold, positioning the party as the sole viable alternative.

Despite this, the PTI might secure participation in elections, albeit without prominent figures. Allowing the PTI to be part of the electoral landscape is pragmatic, as their absence could render the entire electoral process futile. Intriguingly, there are internal voices advocating for a PTI boycott of the elections. However, irrespective of internal debates, the PTI should not relinquish its position and must field candidates across all constituencies.

Learning from past missteps, the PTI should refrain from repeating the error of resigning from assemblies, a move that inadvertently cedes ground to its adversaries. Instead, adopting a strategy of active participation ensures that the PTI remains a formidable force, resilient in the face of challenges. In essence, the party must navigate the complex political terrain with strategic nominations, avoiding self-imposed sidelines and contributing to shaping the political landscape, even in the absence of high-profile figures.