JAMES M. DORSEY

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s world just shrunk considerably. An International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza obliges the Court’s 124 members, or two-thirds of the world’s countries, to arrest Mr. Netanyahu on sight.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s world contracted similarly when the Court ordered his arrest in 2023 for alleged war crimes in Ukraine.

Even so, Mr. Netanyahu and Israel are likely to feel far more than Mr. Putin the impact of the warrant against the prime minister and his former defence minister, Yoav Gallant, whom Mr. Netanyahu fired earlier this month.

Israel has more allies than Russia among ICC members that feel obliged to uphold the rule of law by honouring the Court’s warrant should Messrs. Netanyahu or Gallant be within their jurisdiction.

Israel’s allies include European Union member states, some of whom continue to sell arms to Israel. They are among a minority of countries where Israeli officials are still welcome.

The Court’s move marked the first time the ICC has issued arrest warrants against leaders of a democratic country.

ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan sought the warrants on charges that Messrs. Netanyahu and Gallant allegedly targeted civilians in Gaza and used starvation as a method of war.

Credit: NIAC Action
The court also issued a warrant for Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif, who Israel says it killed in Gaza in July.

The ICC charged Mr. Deif with war crimes in last year’s October 7 Hamas attack on Israel in which some 1,200 people, mostly civilians and non-combatants, were killed and 250 others kidnapped.

Hamas never confirmed Mr. Deif’s killing in contrast to Israel’s assassination of two of the group’s other leaders, Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, whom Mr. Khan had also targeted.

The ICC has no independent mechanism to enforce the warrants. It depends on the 125 signatories of the Rome Statute that established the ICC in 1999 to execute its warrants.

A host of Western officials, including EU foreign affairs czar Josep Borrel, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister Petra de Sutte, Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp, and French Foreign Ministry spokesman Christophe Lemoine, were quick to acknowledge the warrant and suggest they would arrest the Israelis if the opportunity arose.

Far-right European leaders appeared split on the arrest warrants despite Mr. Netanyahu’s investment in building relations over the years.

While Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni’s government said it would have to arrest the prime minister if he were on Italian soil, Hungary’s leader, Victor Orban, in an act of defiance invited Mr. Netanyahu for a visit.

Europe’s honouring of the arrest warrants will likely increase Israel’s international isolation and condemnation as a pariah state.

Israeli reports warned the warrants could lead to a European arms embargo.

Some EU members, including Italy and Britain, have already curtailed arms sales to Israel. France has twice barred Israeli companies from participating in defence exhibitions.

The warrants potentially call into question the German government’s recent controversial approval of US$ 100 million in military exports to Israel.

The government, which is struggling with its response to the arrest warrants, submitted to the court in August a legal brief arguing that the ICC had no jurisdiction over Israel regarding the Gaza war.

As a result, the ICC may have opened a Pandora’s Box by issuing the arrest warrants.

Source: Instagram
Not only do the warrants complicate, but they also potentially prevent Messrs. Netanyahu and Gallant from traveling to Europe.

Furthermore, they will likely make other Israeli officials think twice about visiting Europe. The officials fear that the ICC has issued secret warrants for their arrest or that they could see their freedom of movement restricted by local courts.

In theory, the warrants could make Messrs. Netanyahu and Gallant’s travel to the United States, the one country that has condemned the ICC’s actions, more difficult because their plane could be forced to land in an ICC member state whose airspace their plane traverses.

Moreover, the warrants could further muddle Europe’s already potentially troubled relations with US President-elect Donald J. Trump as Republicans and Democrats line up in support of Israel and threaten to sanction the Court and its judges and prosecutors.

Trita Parsi, the executive director of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, noted, “It is reasonable to expect that once Trump comes in, he will go after the ICC and the ICJ (International Court of Justice) in ways that profoundly damages the multilateral system.”

Michael Waltz, Trump’s nominee as his national security advisor, echoed Mr. Netanyahuand Gallant in his response to the Court’s move, saying, “You can expect a strong response to the antisemitic bias of the ICC & UN come January” when the president-elect takes office.

South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, a staunch Trump supporter, said he would introduce legislation “that puts other countries on notice – If you aid and abet the ICC after their action against the State of Israel, you can expect consequences from the United States. Any nation that joins with the ICC after this outrage is a partner in a reckless act that tramples the rule of law,” Mr. Graham said.

Haaretz headline 22 November 2024
Mr. Netanyahu may see a silver lining at home in the ICC issuing the arrest warrants.

Israelis have rallied behind Mr. Netanyahu, a controversial leader, whom many blame for Hamas’ October 7 attack and Israel’s failure to free some 100 captives still held hostage by the group, in their rejection of the ICC move.

As a result, Mr. Netanyahu will likely use calls by his ultra-nationalist coalition partners to annex the West Bank and administer Gaza in response to the ICC as a license to delay and sabotage Gaza ceasefire efforts and prolong the war.

Mr. Netanyahu “has an overpowering personal interest in the mayhem continuing so as to buy time after the Oct. 7 debacle, until people forget or still bigger tragedies occur,” said Dan Perry, a pro-Israel pundit with little regard for the prime minister.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer

The prospect of  Donald Trump’s return to the White House has generated significant discourse in Tehran, where the primary concern is not what policy trajectory the incoming administration might adopt toward Iran but whether the Islamic Republic should engage in negotiations with the former president. Prominent Iranian officials, including experienced diplomats, argue that Tehran must exercise its agency and signal a willingness to negotiate. This perspective posits that Trump’s strong mandate, as evidenced by the electoral outcome, provides him with the political latitude to broker a mutually beneficial agreement with Iran. However, whether such calls will influence Tehran’s posture in the wake of Trump’s inauguration remains uncertain.

In 2018, during Trump’s first term, his administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the subsequent imposition of a “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign devastated Iran’s economy. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei categorically dismissed the possibility of negotiations with Trump, labeling the American president as unworthy of engagement. Khamenei’s assessment relied on the belief that Trump’s presidency represented an anomaly in U.S. politics. This gamble, however, backfired as U.S.-led sanctions decimated Iran’s oil revenue and international trade, while escalating tensions culminated in the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.Today, the geopolitical landscape has shifted markedly. Trump’s political position appears stronger, and Iran faces increasingly severe domestic and international challenges. The prevailing sentiment in Iranian media underscores an urgent need for recalibration. As one commentator observed, “The era of no war, no peace is over. It’s now the era of either war or peace.” With the Republican Party controlling all three branches of the U.S. government, proponents of negotiation assert that a potential agreement with Trump would carry more durability than the JCPOA, which faced resistance from congressional Republicans.

Iranian commentators also highlight Trump’s unpredictability. While his rhetoric often aligns with anti-war sentiments, his unconventional governance style leaves the possibility of military confrontation open. A Republican-controlled Congress affords Trump significant latitude in foreign policy, potentially allowing him to initiate military action without the constraints faced by previous administrations. This dynamic poses a significant risk to Iranian strategic assets, including its nuclear facilities, should Tehran resist engagement.At the same time, the possibility of a negotiated settlement remains on the table. Figures close to Khamenei suggest a cautious approach, advocating for a wait-and-see strategy to evaluate Trump’s intentions. For instance, Ali Larijani, a moderate advisor to Khamenei, has suggested that Trump may adopt a more constructive approach in his second term. Similarly, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has encouraged Trump to abandon his “maximum pressure” campaign in favor of “maximum wisdom,” signaling that Tehran could reciprocate constructively to avoid conflict.

The Iranian government harbors deep-seated grievances from Trump’s first term, which saw measures such as the “Muslim ban,” the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, and the targeted killing of Soleimani. Despite these hostilities, Trump consistently expressed willingness to negotiate with Iran albeit on terms perceived as highly unfavorable by Tehran. Iranian officials as tantamount to a call for capitulation dismissed his administration’s infamous 12-point demand list.Nonetheless, there are signs that Trump’s second administration might adopt a different approach. His decision to exclude former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, a staunch Iran hawk, from his new team has been interpreted in Tehran as a potential olive branch. However, the composition of Trump’s national security team remains fluid, leaving uncertainty about the influence of hawkish versus isolationist elements within his administration.

A straightforward compromise between Trump and Khamenei could center on Iran’s nuclear program. Trump’s primary demand is the prevention of Iranian nuclear weaponization, a position ostensibly aligned with Khamenei’s 2012 fatwa declaring nuclear weapons un-Islamic. However, tensions extend beyond nuclear issues, encompassing Iran’s regional activities and its role in supporting allied groups across the Middle East. Addressing these broader concerns will likely require concessions from both sides.In this context, regional developments could play a pivotal role. Tehran is reportedly optimistic that Trump might pressure Israel into accepting a ceasefire in conflicts involving Gaza and Lebanon, potentially creating space for dialogue on select regional issues. Larijani’s recent visits to Damascus and Beirut, where he conveyed reassurances to Iran’s allies while advocating for a ceasefire, suggest that Tehran is exploring options to de-escalate regional tensions.

Despite these overtures, Tehran faces a profound strategic dilemma. Should it prioritize preserving the Axis of Resistance a network of regional proxies—or pursue a reorientation of its regional agenda to align more closely with international expectations? While immediate priorities appear to favor the former, growing domestic and international pressures may necessitate a broader rethinking of Iran’s strategic framework.Khamenei’s reluctance to engage with Trump during his first term reflected confidence in Iran’s ability to withstand external pressures. However, the cumulative impact of sanctions, regional setbacks, and domestic unrest has significantly eroded Tehran’s position. Consequently, there is increasing recognition within Iranian policymaking circles that negotiations with Trump, while fraught with uncertainty, may offer a pragmatic pathway to alleviating external pressures.The return of the maximum pressure campaign, albeit under a different guise, remains a central concern for Tehran. While the Biden administration maintained existing sanctions, it did not enforce them with the same vigor as Trump’s first administration. Tehran anticipates that Trump’s renewed emphasis on sanctions could lead to the reactivation of snapback provisions under the JCPOA, particularly if European powers frustrated by Iran’s support for Russia in the Ukraine conflict align with Washington.

At the same time, Tehran sees potential opportunities in the shifting geopolitical landscape. China, a critical buyer of Iranian oil, is unlikely to abandon its partnership with Tehran given its own tensions with Washington. Similarly, Arab states appear inclined to avoid entanglement in U.S.-Iran conflicts, prioritizing regional stability over alignment with American strategies.