Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
The strategic convergence emerging in the Indo-Pacific signifies a notable transformation in the regional security architecture, reflecting both a response to the shifting geopolitical balance and a reassessment of existing alliance structures. However, this convergence represents a transitional phase rather than a conclusive or optimal configuration. The prevailing security arrangements among the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies remain incomplete and fragmented. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which institutionalizes mutual defense commitments and centralized military coordination, the Indo-Pacific lacks binding defense obligations among regional partners and a central command structure for multilateral operations. Coordination exists, but it remains sporadic and lacks the regularized planning processes essential for rapid and cohesive responses to regional threats. The absence of mutual defense obligations among U.S. allies in the region such as Australia, Japan and the Philippines undermines the potential for a unified and effective deterrence posture. While each state maintains bilateral agreements with the United States, the failure to establish inter-allied obligations results in a fragmented network lacking urgency and strategic depth. In this context, the establishment of a collective defense pact focused on these three strategically aligned states offers a pragmatic path forward. Rather than replicating NATO’s expansive structure, a smaller and more focused alliance could enhance operational readiness and strategic cohesion.
Such a pact could, over time, incorporate additional members, subject to political will and strategic necessity. South Korea, due to its economic and military capabilities and geographical proximity, presents a natural candidate. However, its inclusion would necessitate a recalibration of its strategic priorities, particularly in terms of enhancing cooperation with Japan and reorienting its military focus toward a broader regional mandate. New Zealand, a member of the Five Eyes intelligence network, has shown increasing willingness to align with U.S. positions on China, though it may not yet be prepared for formal defense commitments. Meanwhile, key regional actors such as India and Singapore are unlikely to join in the initial stages but may engage through observer roles or limited operational cooperation. The inclusion of Taiwan remains untenable due to prevailing U.S. policy constraints and the geopolitical sensitivities of other potential pact members. Similarly, the incorporation of European allies appears premature, given their current military posture and regional priorities. Nonetheless, a future in which European militaries, supported by increased defense spending and enhanced capabilities, contribute to Indo-Pacific stability remains within the realm of possibility.
The urgency of countering China’s growing assertiveness necessitates immediate preparatory efforts. A foundational step involves transforming existing bilateral relationships among Australia, Japan and the Philippines into a web of mutual obligations. While this would require considerable diplomatic engagement, the strategic payoff in terms of enhanced deterrence would justify the complexity of negotiations. For Australia and Japan in particular, whose military ties with the United States are already deep, the transition from current defense partnerships to mutual defense obligations would entail only incremental changes. Operationally, a Pacific Defense Pact could build upon ongoing cooperative initiatives, including intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and coordination mechanisms. Notable among these are the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Intelligence Analysis Cell at Yokota Air Base, focused on Chinese movements in the East China Sea and the U.S.-Philippines Combined Coordination Center near Manila. These institutions could be expanded to incorporate Australia and the Philippines, fostering a more integrated regional intelligence and command structure. Existing basing agreements and troop rotations provide a logistical foundation upon which multilateral coordination could be built, contingent on the establishment of reciprocal access agreements among allies.
The proposed pact should also envision the development of shared military infrastructure, pre-positioning of munitions and the establishment of a unified headquarters. Japan emerges as a potential site for such a command center, especially in light of the United States’ intention to upgrade its regional command in Japan. However, alternative locations, including Australia and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, could also be considered. A formalized structure would necessitate the creation of working groups comprising defense and foreign ministry officials tasked with negotiating governance frameworks, legal protocols and decision-making mechanisms. These institutional mechanisms would form the backbone of a robust, day-to-day alliance management system. Moreover, the realignment of existing U.S. bilateral treaties in the region is necessary to reflect contemporary realities. These treaties, designed during an era of uncontested American primacy, reflect asymmetrical commitments that are increasingly misaligned with the capabilities and responsibilities of modern U.S. allies. For decades, U.S. protection was exchanged for military access and economic cooperation, without reciprocal commitments to support U.S. operations beyond the allies’ territories. Today, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China presents credible threats not only to U.S. forces in the region but also to the U.S. mainland and American allies now possess the economic and technological wherewithal to shoulder a greater share of the defense burden.
Reciprocity is becoming both a strategic necessity and a domestic political imperative in the United States. Growing bipartisan sentiment in the U.S. underscores the demand for allies to contribute more substantively to collective security. Former President Donald Trump, among others, has criticized allied free-riding and emphasized equitable burden-sharing. Although increased defense spending is part of this equation, genuine reciprocity must also encompass greater mutual obligations. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, for instance, limits Japan’s commitment to its own territory, producing a strategic imbalance at high-level summits where U.S. leaders pledge defense commitments while Japanese counterparts remain silent on reciprocal obligations. Realignment would enable more integrated military planning, shared procurement of complementary capabilities and coordinated training exercises tailored to regional contingencies. Clarity on access, basing and overflight rights is vital for enabling rapid U.S. military responses and forward deployments. Infrastructure development and strategic mobility would be enhanced through such access agreements, reinforcing deterrence and facilitating sustained military operations during crises. These changes would inevitably raise complex sovereignty and legal issues, but such matters can be addressed through careful diplomacy and phased implementation.
Tensions in economic and diplomatic domains particularly if exacerbated by protectionist U.S. policies could complicate security cooperation. Nonetheless, security establishments in the United States and its allies should seek to compartmentalize defense collaboration from broader political disagreements. The strategic stakes involved necessitate continuity in security planning irrespective of domestic or bilateral disruptions. Despite the challenges, recent trends demonstrate growing resilience in U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific. The deteriorating security environment, driven by China’s revisionist posture and assertive actions in the East and South China Seas, has prompted an increased appetite for security cooperation among U.S. allies. Even if the current U.S. administration lacks the coherence to execute this vision fully, the groundwork can be laid for a future administration to finalize the pact.
Crucially, regional allies must secure domestic political support for deeper integration. Strategic arguments alone may not suffice; highlighting tangible benefits such as technology transfers, disaster resilience and infrastructure development may enhance public acceptance. In the United States, the proposed pact would not impose new obligations beyond existing ones but would reinforce homeland security and the safety of forward-deployed troops. The United States must also engage the broader Indo-Pacific region diplomatically to assuage concerns and avoid the perception of exclusive bloc formation. A prospective defense pact should be framed as one pillar within a broader strategy encompassing multilateral frameworks such as the Quad, ASEAN and trilateral partnerships. Its stated objective ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific aligns with widely shared regional values and objectives. Importantly, the proposed alliance should limit its scope to defense, refraining from overlapping with economic and diplomatic institutions. Its success will be augmented by parallel initiatives in trade, diplomacy and development assistance. Predictably, China will condemn the formation of any new security coalition as evidence of “Cold War thinking” and “bloc politics.” Chinese military officials have already described efforts to consolidate American-led alliances in Asia as binding the region to the U.S. “war chariot.” Such rhetoric underscores Beijing’s apprehension about the formation of an effective counter-coalition.
