ISLAMABAD, APR 1 /DNA/ – During the first quarter of 2026, Pakistan recorded a nearly 18% quarter-on-quarter decline in violence related to terrorism and counter-terrorism, along with a mix of promising and concerning trends in the country’s security landscape. The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) tallied as many as 813 violence-linked fatalities and 518 injuries – among civilians, security personnel, and outlaws – across at least 248 incidents involving both terrorist attacks and the state’s counter-terrorism operations.
In terms of comparative impact, the reported drop in violence between Q4, 2025 to Q1, 2026 (from 990 to 813 deaths) was largely driven by the sharp reduction in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which recorded over 57% less fatalities compared to the last quarter i.e. 311 vs 727. However, this aggregate decline masks a significant deterioration in other parts of the country. For instance, the Balochistan province saw over 104% percent surge in violence, with fatalities jumping from 217 to 443 – marking the highest toll in the last thirteen years.
The Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) saw a 185 percent surge (13 to 37), driven largely by a suicide attack at a Shiite Mosque on February 6 that marked the capital’s deadliest incident since 2008. Punjab, while starting from a low base, recorded a 367 percent rise (3 to 14), signalling a concerning expansion of violence into the country’s most populous province.
The data indicate that while TTP-driven violence in KP is receding, it is being offset by rising lethality in Balochistan, with concerning early signs of spillover into Punjab and the capital.
In terms of regional impact, both KP and Balochistan were the epicentres of violence, jointly accounting for almost 93% of all violence-linked fatalities, with over 38% (311) recorded in the former and almost 55% (443) in the latter province, marking it the most fatally hit region during the period under review. However, the trend reverses for the incidents of violence; despite ranking second in terms of fatalities, KP suffered the highest number of violent incidents in Q1, 2026 i.e. 147 (59%), followed by Balochistan with 87 (35% of all incidents of violence). Moreover, KP also suffered the majority of violence-linked injuries recorded in this period, followed by ICT and Balochistan.
The capital city presents an unusual injury profile. Three attacks resulted in 170 injuries but only 37 fatalities – an injury-to-fatality ratio of nearly 5:1. This pattern is consistent with large-scale blasts in densely populated areas, like the February 6 suicide bombing, which accounted for the overwhelming majority of the capital’s casualties
Gilgit-Baltistan and Sindh together accounted for just 4 incidents and 8 fatalities, reflecting minimal terrorist activity relative to the rest of the country.
In the first quarter of 2026, the terrorist attacks outnumbered security forces operations by a factor of nearly 2.7 to one in frequency (180 vs 68), yet the security forces’ operations accounted for a disproportionately higher share of fatalities – 449 outlaws killed versus 364 fatalities among civilians and security officials – despite being the less frequent event type. This finding indicates that each security operation is, on average, far more lethal than each terrorist attack.
However, the terrorist attacks, by contrast, produced over nine times more injuries (467 vs 51), which points to tactics designed to maximize crowd-level harm, bombings, and suicide attacks in public spaces, where blast radius injures many but kills fewer proportionally. Security operations, on the other hand, appear to result in more conclusive engagements, with very few survivors among those engaged.
The elevated casualty toll from terror attacks reflects a marked shift in militant tactics, driven by the increased use of explosives and more sophisticated weaponry. A notable development in this period is the adoption of drone technology by both Baloch separatist groups and the TTP and its affiliates.
In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, at least 16 drone attacks were recorded during the quarter, with single incidents also documented in Balochistan and Punjab, bringing the national total to 18. Of these, only one was formally claimed – a TTP strike on the FC Fort in Karak, KP. The remaining attacks went unclaimed. In a significant counter-measure, security forces conducted seven drone strikes of their own against militant targets, all within KP – marking a consolidation of state drone capability in the province.
Five suicide attacks were also recorded in the period. Three were vehicle-borne, a tactic that substantially amplifies blast yield and lethality. Four of the five attacks occurred in KP, with the fifth striking an imambargah in Islamabad during Friday prayers, killing 36 people. That attack, claimed by ISIS, was the deadliest in the capital since the 2008 Marriott Hotel bombing.
Historically, militant activity in Pakistan’s mountainous regions, particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, declines during the winter months due to harsh weather and limited mobility. However, the data for the winter period reveal a pattern that challenges seasonal explanations alone, with 230 fatalities in December 2025, 312 in January 2026, and 356 in February.
Rather than declining, fatalities increased through the winter months, with February recording the second-highest total of the entire 14-month dataset.
The data reveals a striking anomaly in March 2026, with 145 fatalities recorded. This represents a 59 percent decline from February’s total of 356 and is 50 percent below the average monthly fatality rate for the preceding 14 months.
This sharp decline is difficult to explain through seasonal patterns alone and appears to be influenced by broader geopolitical developments. A late-March Pakistan–Afghanistan ceasefire may have contributed to a partial reduction in cross-border and TTP-linked violence, though its limited timeframe explains only part of the drop. More significantly, the onset of the US–Israel–Iran conflict in late February may have disrupted militant networks, diverted external support, and introduced strategic uncertainty, leading to a temporary operational pause.
Taken together, these factors suggest the March decline may represent a short-term, externally driven reprieve rather than a sustained downward trend, with its durability dependent on evolving regional dynamics.
