by Muhammad Mohsin Iqbal
Success in the real world is never born of illusion. It is first bestowed by the grace of Almighty Allah and then shaped by human effort, competence, and the circumstances of history. Nations that rise do so by confronting their realities, correcting their flaws, and building institutions worthy of trust. Yet, there is a curious pattern that has repeatedly surfaced whenever India faces defeat at the hands of Pakistan, whether in war, diplomacy, or other arenas of national comparison. Instead of engaging with facts and introspection, it often seeks refuge in cinematic fantasies, using films and popular culture to manufacture narratives aimed at denigrating Pakistan. This time, their target through films is the Lyari constituency of Karachi. Propaganda, however, loses its potency when confronted with documented truth. A serious examination of India’s own internal challenges, particularly the use of crime-related resources in its electoral politics, tells a far more sobering story—one supported not by rhetoric, but by India’s own official reports, courts, and watchdog institutions.
The nexus between crime and politics in India is neither speculative nor incidental; it is systemic and long acknowledged. From localized strongmen to sophisticated syndicates with transnational reach, criminal networks have entrenched themselves deeply within the political process. Their involvement ranges from financing election campaigns to enforcing electoral outcomes and securing post-election rewards. The most authoritative exposure of this phenomenon came through the Vohra Committee Report of 1993, an official document commissioned by the Government of India. Drawing upon intelligence from the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Intelligence Bureau, RAW, and revenue enforcement agencies, the report warned of a “close nexus” between criminal gangs, politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen. It documented how organized crime syndicates, sustained by immense financial and muscle power derived from smuggling, narcotics, real estate, and black money, were operating with near impunity due to political patronage, institutional weaknesses, corruption, and poor inter-agency coordination. The report went further, cautioning that these syndicates were evolving into parallel power structures and recommended the creation of a highly secret, centralized nodal mechanism under the Ministry of Home Affairs to dismantle this dangerous convergence.
Historically, criminal elements played a direct role in elections through intimidation, booth capturing, and violence. While the introduction of Electronic Voting Machines and the deployment of central police forces have reduced overt coercion, subtler forms of pressure persist. Threats before polling day, manipulation of local influence, and control through fear or patronage continue to shape electoral outcomes. In many regions, particularly in states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the phenomenon of the “Bahubali” politician—an individual who commands votes through muscle, money, caste allegiance, or coercion—remains deeply entrenched.
Elections in India are enormously expensive, and this financial burden fuels the reliance on illicit capital. The Association for Democratic Reforms (ADRs), the most credible civil society organization tracking electoral integrity, has consistently reported that a significant portion of election expenditure is unaccounted black money. Criminal networks are a major source of this funding, which is used for rallies, inducements, and direct cash distribution to voters. In Punjab and the north-western belt, reports by the Punjab State Narcotics Control Bureau and assessments by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have highlighted the use of drug trafficking money to fund elections. Allegations of collusion between politicians and narcotics cartels, seeking policy protection and immunity from crackdowns, have been repeatedly raised in official and media investigations.
The investment of the underworld in politics is not charitable; it is transactional. Once a candidate wins, repayment comes in the form of lucrative public contracts, protection from law enforcement, manipulation of investigations, and the strategic transfer of officials. This quid pro quo lies at the heart of the criminalization of politics. ADR’s empirical findings are stark. Its 2024 analysis of sitting Lok Sabha members revealed that 19 percent had declared serious criminal cases, including charges of murder, attempt to murder, rape, and crimes against women. Earlier, its 2022 study of state assemblies showed that in some states, such as Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, over 30 percent of legislators faced serious criminal charges.
India’s own institutions have repeatedly sounded the alarm. The Election Commission of India has, through multiple communications to the Law Ministry—widely reported in leading newspapers such as The Hindu—sought enhanced powers to curb criminalization, including the authority to bar candidates accused of serious offences and to audit political party finances. The judiciary, too, has intervened. In Public Interest Foundation versus Union of India (2014), the Supreme Court directed that trials against sitting MPs and MLAs be conducted on a day-to-day basis and concluded within a year. In 2020, the Court again expressed deep anguish over Parliament’s failure to legislate against this menace.
Specific regional cases further illuminate the depth of the problem. In Mumbai, figures associated with the underworld, such as Arun Gawli, entered electoral politics, a linkage examined by the Justice S.N. Variava Commission. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, land and drug mafias have repeatedly surfaced in election reports. In the North-East, insurgent groups and smugglers have influenced polls through funding and intimidation, while in Punjab, The Special Task Force (STF) and Narcotics Control Bureau reports have documented the arrest of political workers linked to the drug trade during election periods.
This nexus persists due to weak party accountability, voter dependency in areas with fragile state institutions, a slow judicial process that allows accused individuals to contest elections for years, and opaque campaign finance mechanisms. While measures by the Election Commission, Supreme Court mandates on disclosure, and the use of the Right to Information Act have increased transparency, they have not dismantled the core structure of money, muscle, and patronage.
These are not allegations made by adversaries, nor narratives crafted in studios. They are findings recorded in India’s own official reports, courts, and democratic institutions. Nations are judged not by the stories they tell about others, but by the truths they confront within themselves. Reality, unlike fiction, does not bend to propaganda, and history ultimately records facts, not fantasies.
