By Shamim Shahid
PESHAWAR: In a bid to address the highly tense and uncertain situation that has prevailed for decades due to terrorism and violence, the National Security meeting in Islamabad has taken a series of critical decisions. Among them is the targeting of what has been termed as “terrorist dens” across the border in Afghanistan. Following this significant parliamentary meeting, Defense Minister Khawaja Asif indicated the possibility of cross-border operations, asserting that Pakistan will act wherever necessary to protect its national security.
No one can deny the universal truth that the resolution of all issues—whether political, economic, or strategic—ultimately rests in dialogue and political means. The longstanding tensions and confrontations with Afghanistan have been inherited, yet instead of handling them with the wisdom of socio-political elders, the military establishment continues to follow the doctrines of its former British colonial rulers, further complicating the situation.
Pakistan has long been considered a security state, but as Imtiaz Alam rightly argues, branding it a “hard state” as a solution to the weaknesses of a “soft state” is highly misleading. He asserts that the crisis within the state stems from the failure of a “garrison-led” approach. Further hardening the state, he warns, will only exacerbate its crises and push it toward the brink of collapse.
Several past leaders recognized the importance of political dialogue for resolving disputes with Afghanistan. Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was among the first to take steps in this direction, engaging in talks with Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan in 1976. However, Cold War strategists opposed their reconciliatory efforts, leading to Bhutto’s ouster under the banner of Nizam-i-Mustafa, while Daud Khan was overthrown and assassinated by so-called revolutionaries.
For a long time, the United States, with the support of its trusted allies, has exerted influence over the global order. After the 2009 Afghan presidential elections, the US realized that some coalition partners in the war on terror were playing a double game. While publicly announcing evacuation plans, Washington covertly shifted its strategy by sponsoring and guiding Afghan religious extremists through Qatar instead of Saudi Arabia. The consequences of this shift are now evident, particularly in how Pakistan has been left to navigate its own ironies. The policymakers in Rawalpindi and Islamabad must prioritize putting their own house in order rather than contemplating air and ground strikes in a neighboring country that has already endured external aggression for over four decades.
Pakistan has made enemies of both hegemonic India and the Taliban, who exploit insurgencies to their advantage. If Pakistan is to secure its future, it must address the longstanding grievances of the Baloch people by respecting their national rights and ceasing senseless repression. Genuine political dialogue and reconciliation remain the only viable path to resolving internal and external conflicts, especially terrorism, violence, and armed resistance in Balochistan.
The people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have the resilience to fight Taliban terrorism, even if left to do so alone. However, they have lost faith in state institutions. Before expecting their support, authorities in Islamabad must work to restore their trust. Once that trust is rebuilt, they can be backed sincerely in the fight against the Taliban. Similarly, addressing the root causes of Baloch grievances and finding a pathway to reconciliation is essential. Engaging in conflicts with all three neighbors while alienating one’s own people is a suicidal strategy.
It is time for Pakistan’s leadership to reconsider its approach, prioritize domestic stability, and adopt a diplomatic and reconciliatory path to resolve conflicts. The future of the nation depends on it.
