Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
The intensifying pressure on democracy has emerged as a significant challenge for policymakers and practitioners, drawing considerable attention from scholars. There is widespread agreement among experts regarding a global decline in democratization alongside a rise in autocratization. The democratization wave that generated substantial optimism after 1989 began to wane in the mid-2000s, giving way to what some describe as a “new wave of autocratization” or “democratic regression”. While the idea of an autocratization wave remains contested (Skaaning, 2020), specific aspects warrant deeper examination. Alarmingly, the decline is not confined to weakly institutionalized democracies or low-income nations; even consolidated democracies such as Hungary and Poland EU members with strong middle-income economies have experienced democratic regression. More strikingly, large democracies like India and Brazil, as well as nations traditionally seen as resistant to such trends, including the United States, have also shown signs of democratic regression. The outcomes of these regressions vary, ranging from transitions from liberal to flawed democracies to outright authoritarianism.
One notable concern pertains to the international implications of this trend. The global distribution of liberal democracies versus autocracies has exacerbated competition between regime models on a global scale. Governments of eroding democracies increasingly challenge the liberal international order by abandoning multilateral frameworks, adopting counter-hegemonic strategies and either withdrawing from international institutions or refraining from joining significant international agreements. Additionally, autocratization is shifting the balance of global economic power and trade relations, as countries like India and Turkey align themselves with authoritarian regimes. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has further heightened security concerns and increased awareness among democracies of their vulnerabilities and dependencies on autocratic states.
The concept of “democratic regression” is pivotal in understanding this phenomenon. Erdmann and Kneuer categorize democratic regression into three forms: the decline of democratic quality within democracies, the erosion of democracy into hybrid regimes, and the breakdown of democracy into outright dictatorship. These processes are encapsulated under two primary trajectories: “rapid death” (breakdown) and “slow death” (loss of democratic quality and erosion). Since Lust and Waldner’s (2015) seminal work, the notion of “democratic backsliding” has gained significant traction, becoming a dominant term for describing the gradual decline of democracy. A search on Google Scholar reveals over 17,700 references to “democratic backsliding” in titles since 2010, with 16,500 of these appearing between 2020 and 2023. Despite its widespread adoption, the term has faced criticism. Scholars such as Bogaards (2018) and Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) argue that it implies an unintentional or unconscious reversal, which may not always align with the intentional actions observed in many cases of democratic decline. Moreover, the term suggests a return to a previous state, which may not accurately describe transitions from democracy to hybrid or authoritarian regimes without reverting to prior political systems.Alternatively, the term “democratic erosion” more precisely captures the gradual and agent-driven processes that undermine democratic structures. As Kneuer (2021) highlights, erosion conveys the involvement of an agent (such as political actors) and a structure (democracy) that is incrementally hollowed out, leaving behind a façade of its former self. This façade is often repurposed to support illiberal and anti-democratic governance. Although metaphors inherently carry ambiguity, “erosion” provides a clearer depiction of the process’s agents, subjects, and outcomes than “backsliding.”
A critical task for scholars is to define the starting point of these processes. Some researchers conceptualize these changes as “de-democratization,” emphasizing the movement away from democratic norms. Others prefer “autocratization,” which Cassani and Tomini (2019) describe as a “regime change toward autocracy,” encompassing shifts from democracy as well as from other regime types. Lührmann and Lindberg, however, broaden the scope of autocratization to include processes occurring in both democratic and autocratic contexts. This broad application has drawn criticism, as it risks conflating temporary and contingent losses of democratic quality with sustained and substantial transformations. For instance, France’s state of emergency following the 2015 terrorist attacks led to a temporary decline in civil liberties and democratic quality, as reflected in lower scores by Freedom House and the Democracy Index. However, France subsequently regained its status as a full democracy, demonstrating that not all declines signal long-term autocratization or democratic erosion.A more precise approach conceptualizes regime transformation along a democracy-autocracy continuum, where democratization and autocratization represent substantial and sustained improvements or declines in democratic attributes (Maerz et al., 2021). Within this framework, democratic regression pertains to declines within democratic regimes, while autocratic deepening describes further deterioration within autocratic states. Democratic erosion, therefore, encompasses processes such as the decline in democratic quality, transitions from liberal to electoral democracies, and eventual breakdowns into electoral authoritarian regimes. Distinguishing between democratic erosion and contingent losses of quality requires attention to the intentionality and normative commitments of political actors.
Agency plays a central role in driving democratic erosion. Scholars widely agree that democratic erosion results from deliberate actions by political leaders who exploit their control over executive and legislative branches to alter democratic norms. Leaders such as Hugo Chávez, Viktor Orbán, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and others have demonstrated the ability to change the rules of the game through legal and electoral means, thereby securing legitimacy while implementing illiberal agendas. These “erosion agents” act under three conditions: possessing the power to enact changes, the intention to undermine democracy, and the ability to mobilize support for their agenda.Normative commitment to democracy is another critical factor. Mainwaring (2022) emphasizes that the longevity of democracy often depends on the commitment of political actors to uphold democratic principles. Erosion agents, by contrast, lack such commitment, actively seeking to replace democratic norms with illiberal and anti-democratic alternatives. Leaders such as Chávez openly rejected representative democracy, portraying it as an outdated and oppressive system, and sought to establish alternative models like participatory democracy. However, these models often fail to meet the standards of democratic governance, undermining core principles such as representativeness and checks and balances.Ultimately, understanding democratic regression requires distinguishing between different processes and their underlying causes. While democratic erosion involves the gradual weakening of democratic norms and institutions, autocratization signifies a more profound transformation toward authoritarianism. Temporary and contingent declines, as seen in cases like France, highlight the importance of context in assessing the trajectory of democratic change. By examining the actions, intentions, and normative commitments of political actors, scholars can better identify the drivers of democratic regression and develop strategies to counteract these trends.
