Dr. Muhammad Akram Zaheer
The advent of new technologies has significantly heightened the risks posed by adversarial states and revisionist actors, thereby expanding the spectrum of potential threats to national security. Information and communication technologies, for example, not only augment military capabilities but also serve as potent instruments for propaganda and disinformation campaigns. Furthermore, advancements in the biosciences, while offering lifesaving interventions on the battlefield, simultaneously elevate the risks associated with biological warfare. The mysterious nature of unidentified aerial phenomena further underscores the possibility of sophisticated technologies that remain beyond the understanding of even the highest levels of U.S. officials. As Senator Marco Rubio of Florida recently emphasized, Anything that enters an airspace that’s not supposed to be there is a threat. The entrenched political dynamics in Washington exacerbate these security challenges, with the Pentagon, benefiting from a considerably larger budget than the State Department, finding it easier to secure funding for security initiatives over diplomatic efforts. In an era of constrained budgets, policy entrepreneurs frequently frame their concerns as national security issues to access resources from the Department of Defense, a process widely recognized in international relations as securitization.
At the turn of the century, U.S. officials classified HIV/AIDS as a national security threat, arguing that the disease undermined economies and threatened the stability of governments in Africa. Although this rationale may have been overstated, it succeeded in channeling substantial resources to combat the epidemic, notably through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which has been credited with saving millions of lives in Africa since its inception during the George W. Bush administration. Economic and technological concerns often garner bipartisan support in national security debates. Since the Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik program in 1957, U.S. policymakers have been preoccupied with the fear of losing technological supremacy to other great powers. Initially, this concern centered on Moscow, shifted to Japan during the 1980s and 1990s and more recently, has focused on China. This apprehension has driven policymakers to prioritize technologies considered critical to maintaining economic dominance. In recent years, the spotlight has been on semiconductors and for the foreseeable future, artificial intelligence is expected to dominate national security discussions. These trends contribute to an ever-expanding list of national security priorities. As more issues are added to this agenda, it becomes increasingly difficult for policymakers to prioritize the most pressing threats.
During the Cold War, U.S. officials were able to assess global issues through a simplified lens, allowing them to distinguish the most significant foreign policy concerns. However, the recent tendency of administrations to declare a wide range of issues as national security concerns has the potential to obscure the most critical dangers. One approach to refining and clarifying national security doctrine lies in the shifting balance of power between the two major political parties. During the Cold War, presidential candidates often emphasized missile gaps or windows of vulnerability as central national security concerns. Republicans have traditionally highlighted threats from malevolent actors, while Democrats have focused more on diffuse threats such as climate change and pandemics. These differences often lead to conflicting views on key national security issues. For instance, conservatives tend to downplay the threat of climate change, whereas progressives argue that failing to address it poses a significant risk. Similarly, House Republicans contend that reducing U.S. production of coal, oil and natural gas undermines national security, while progressives warn that ignoring climate change is the greater danger. A shift in political power would likely lead to a corresponding change in Washington’s national security priorities. However, in practice, even with a new administration, the list of national security concerns tends to expand rather than contract. For example, the 2002 National Security Strategy under the George W. Bush administration went beyond the Clinton administration by identifying poverty, pandemic diseases, biological and genetic threats and environmental degradation as significant national security concerns. While the Bush administration’s strategy prominently addressed terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, it also retained many of the Clinton administration’s priorities. More recently, the Trump administrations focus on great-power competition, as articulated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, might have been viewed as an anomaly. However, the Biden administration’s 2022 strategy continued to prioritize competition with China and Russia, explicitly stating that the People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.
Political prudence often prevents administrations from downplaying their predecessors’ national security concerns. Exaggerated threats can be justified as precautionary measures, while underestimating potential threats can lead to severe consequences if they escalate into crises. For example, the Trump administration’s inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic was partly due to its disbanding of the National Security Council’s Directorate for Global Health, Security and Biodefense in 2018, a decision that reflected a different perception of pandemic threats compared to many experts. Additionally, bureaucratic politics play a significant role in maintaining national security priorities. Issues that have been categorized as national security concerns continue to receive funding and bureaucracies are resistant to downgrading these priorities as it would impact their core missions and expertise. The perspectives of elites on future geopolitical developments can influence their willingness to downplay threats. When optimistic about the future, elites may propose long-term solutions to mitigate threats, as seen in the 1990s with the belief that the liberal international order would integrate Russia and China into a more U.S.-aligned framework. Conversely, when pessimistic, any potential threat is amplified, leading to an all-encompassing focus on national security. Given the current geopolitical climate, characterized by increased conflicts, rising protectionism and democratic recessions, it is impractical to expect a reduction in the list of national security priorities.
Several factors have contributed to the proliferation of new issues within the realm of national security. The continuous addition of threats has diluted the concept of national security, as evidenced by recent iterations of the National Security Strategy. This document often functions merely as a procedural formality for executive branch agencies, thereby limiting its utility in shaping foreign policy. This shortcoming has been evident in recent years, with successive administrations neglecting issues outlined in their respective National Security Strategies. For instance, officials from the Trump administration downplayed the threat of pandemics, while those from the Biden administration claimed that the Middle East was stable. Despite these criticisms, the national security issues identified in these annual reports are generally legitimate. Russia and China, as rival great powers, fundamentally diverge in their values from those of the United States. The past decade has clearly demonstrated how pandemics and climate change can severely affect American life. Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, may also present critical threats to national security in the near future. However, if national security challenges cannot be easily downgraded or eliminated, they should at least be better organized. Even novices in foreign policy understand that national security concerns can be classified by country (e.g., Iran, North Korea) and by theme (e.g., nonproliferation, cybersecurity).
To better manage the ever-expanding list of issues, there are at least two strategies for improvement. First, U.S. officials should categorize national security issues by their timescale and urgency. Some issues, such as terrorism and Russian revanchism, present immediate and pressing risks. Others, like artificial intelligence and China’s rising power, are concerns of medium-term significance. Still, other issues, such as climate change, pose current challenges but will have their most profound impacts in the long term. By explicitly outlining the anticipated timing of specific threats, the government can more effectively allocate resources. This approach does not imply that urgent concerns should overshadow important but longer-term threats. Instead, it advocates for a reasoned basis for reallocating resources away from less immediate threats. Prioritizing urgency would also enable successive administrations to clearly define which initiatives they plan to pursue during their tenure. Another approach to clarifying the relative importance of national security threats is to determine whether an issue requires proactive measures, defensive responses, or a combination of both. New viruses with pandemic potential cannot be addressed until they emerge and are challenging to contain once they do, necessitating a preventive stance. Public health officials must be prepared for contact tracing and testing, while scientists should focus on developing tests and vaccines. Conversely, attempting to eradicate diseases that have already transitioned from animals to humans is often impractical and resource-intensive. Countering terrorist cells might necessitate offensive measures, such as covert operations or special forces interventions. Managing China’s growing economic and military power requires a balanced mix of offensive and defensive strategies to safeguard U.S. interests without unnecessarily escalating tensions to the point of armed conflict.
The government might consider implementing an annual scorecard to rank national security concerns according to their current significance. This method would allow policymakers to highlight the areas of national security they perceive as most pressing at present, while also providing the public with insights into how various threats have been evaluated over time. Additionally, scorecards would enable administrations to deprioritize certain threats without disregarding them entirely. This mechanism would compel U.S. officials to indicate which issues are comparatively less critical, even if the specific rankings are contentious. Such an approach would enhance focus in national security debates and assist in identifying threats that may be undervalued. The challenge of calibrating national security priorities has long been a difficulty for U.S. officials. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a speech to the National Press Club in which he delineated the regions considered within the U.S. defense perimeter, notably excluding the Korean Peninsula. However, when North Korea invaded South Korea less than six months later, the Truman administration responded by deploying 300,000 troops, indicating that Korea was not a U.S. national security priority until it became one. Over the past 70 years, the concept of national security has expanded nearly beyond recognition. Advances in technology have multiplied the avenues through which external threats can impact the United States. Moreover, as security issues necessitate larger staffs and budgets, policy entrepreneurs are incentivized to present their interests as national.
